Ordnance Industry Report

Foreword To The Ordnance Industry Report

This industry report constitutes an assessment of the production of the German ordnance industry and the degree to which it was affected by bombing.

"Ordnance" is a term which must be defined. Except where notations indicate the contrary, "ordnance" in this report includes all types of weapons utilized by the armed forces, including artillery, small arms, bombs land, mines, grenades, and small rocket firing pieces. Ali components of these and all shells are also included. Ammunition, significantly, constitutes the major volume of ordnance production both by number of items and by amounts of steel and other materials used. Tanks, V-1 and V-2 weapons, submarine torpedoes, explosives, propellants, range finders and locators, and chemical warfare equipment are not included in the term "ordnance".

Further definition must be made of the term "ordnance industry" to explain that, just as in the United States no separate industry existed in Germany for the production of ordnance. Ordnance items were produced by the steel making and the steel fabricating industries. A few small companies had a peacetime production limited to small, arms, but the great mass of German ordnance manufacture was accomplished through the expansion of the peacetime facilities of such well known producers as Krupp, Bochumer Verein, and Rheinmetall-Borsig. Beyond this, practically every steel maker and metal fabricator and many non-metal working companies were brought into the manufacture of guns, shells or components thereof to an estimated total of more than 5,000 plants throughout Germany.

This industry study is based primarily on the findings at the 10 ordnance plants which were investigated (see Exhibit F). It must be noted, however, that these plants were steel and heavy industry companies forging and finishing guns and shells of 75 mm or larger. They were selected because it was felt, in view of the paucity of time and team personnel, that it was most important to concentrate on those phases of ordnance production which call for the most extensive machinery and the highest technical ability.

Apart from the size and varied character of the ordnance industry, another difficulty involved in this study has been the lack of overall records available for consideration. No association of ordnance producing plants existed which provided a coordinated picture of the industry as was the case with most German industries, except for the important Speer reports, available governmental records have for the most part proven fragmentary because of the assiduousness with which Nazi officials and the armed forces destroyed or concealed their records. Similarly, the interrogations of officials of the Reich ministries, the Defense Forces, the Regional Armament Inspectorates, the Sub-regional Armament Inspectorates, and the Main Committees, have yielded little material of substance. However, the records of the Planning Office and Albert Speer's personal files are comprehensive and afford the best available overall picture of the development of ordnance production in Germany. These schedules have been cross checked against all factual data obtained and the figures appear to-be accurate and free from the self-justifying bias which characterizes the reports of so many Nazi officials.

The significant observation is made that the ordnance industry was never a selected target for strategic bombing. Many plants were never bombed, others were hit only in area raids, while still others were struck only by spillover bombs intended for other targets. Furthermore, the intelligence and statistical records of the Eighth, and Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth US Air Forces, of the RAF, and of the US Strategic Bombing Survey do not segregate ordnance manufacture as a target classification. Consequently it is not possible to determine the number of raids or the tonnage or type of bombs dropped in attacks on the "ordnance industry."

All references in the report to tons of ordnance or steel are metric tons (1,000 kilograms, or 2,204.6 pounds avoirdupois).

I. Brief Review Of The Industry in Germany Before the War

1. Location - geographical concentration

a. The ordnance industry of Germany was of necessity located in the steel producing and industrialized areas of the country. A rough estimate places two-thirds of armament research and production in the Ruhr area, with Silesia as the center next in importance. An exception to this was the small arms production of Germany, which was largely centered in Buhl and Zella - Mehlis in Thuringia, and the Mauser plant at Oberndorf in the Black Forest.

2. Principal ordnance manufacturing units and plant integration

a. The great majority of German armament producing plants appear to have been privately owned and operated enterprises, but it must be recognised that, during the pre-war period no ordnance industry existed solely for the purpose of producing armaments. Ordnance was largely made in a few closely integrated plants where its manufacture constituted but a small part of the total business normally carried on.

b. The three largest ordnance manufacturing concerns were Friedrich Krupp, Rheinmetall-Borsig A.G. and the Bochumer Verein, the latter being the plant authorised for ordnance production under the Versailles Treaty. Plant studies have been made of two of the Krupp plants, two of the Rheinmetall-Borsig plants and of the Bochumer Verein. The Krupp concern, particularly the Krupp plant at Essen, was the dominant company concerned with the development of heavy guns and shells. The Essen plant included a steel plant, forge shop and heavy machine shops, so that artillery pieces could be completed from forgings and parts made within the plant. Rheinmetall-Borsig was the second most important developer of ordnance materials, particularly in the field of flak artillery. The Bochumer Verein was capable of extensive munitions manufacturing, and during the war became the largest single producer of artillery barrel forgings. This again was a completely integrated plant.

Other large steel and heavy manufacturing plants were similarly engaged in munitions manufacturing. It is to be noted, however, that the complete plant integration prevalent in pre-war Germany is directly opposed to the wartime pattern of the ordnance industry.

3. Degree of governmental ownership and supervision

a. In the main the development and production of armament in pre-war Germany was accomplished through close co-operation between the armed forces and selected companies most of which, as has already been stated, were privately owned and remained so thoughout the war. The army controlled only the ordnance and ammunition depots. These were used not only for storage but also for maintenance and repair work. Some ammunition depots had facilities for making accessories such as fuses, and many of the major ammunition depots also functioned as shell filling and assembly plants.

b. Albert Speer has stated that some of the prewar expansion of armament production - there was not much, because, for the short war anticipated, it was planned to convert foundries, machine shops and other plants to ordnance manufacturing - was effected by the construction of state financed shadow factories (especially for ammunition) which wire owned by the Reich and attached to existing private concerns.

4. Dependence upon imports from other countries:

a. Germany was self-sufficient in the manufacture of ordnance items. A few prototype models of guns may have been bought from such foreign producers as Skoda, Manfred Weiss or Bofors, but no evidence of this has been uncovered. Even if individual weapons were sought to further technical developments it is certain that in both creative skill and productive capacity Germany was independent of major imports of weapons or shells.

II. Planning For The Industry In Anticipation Of War

1. Government supervision

a. The organizational structure of government agencies and quasi-official bodies which planned and administered ordnance production in Germany before and during the war are a confusing complexity of offices and personalities.

b. In pre-Hitler Germany the armed forces were under the authority of the Reichswehr Ministry (Ministry of Defense). In 1933, when the controlled economy was established the Defense Economics Division came into being parallel with Funk's Reich Ministry of Economics supervising the civilian economy. In 1935 Hitler established the Army Command, the Navy Command, and the Air Ministry, all reporting to the Reich Ministry of War. This top ministry had a Armed Forces Office to which the Defence Economics Division was subordinate. This lasted until 1938 when Hitler proclaimed himself Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, abolished the Ministry of War, and established Field Marshal Keitel as Chief of the Military High Command for the co-ordination of the plans and operations of the three military branches comprising the Defense Forces. In this change the Defense Economics Division was replaced by the Office of War Economy and Armament under General Thomas. The responsibilities of this office were: to develop plans for the economic mobilization of Germany, to determine the needs of the armed forces and to prepare detailed instructions for the participation of industry in the mobilization plan. This agency prepared such a program, known as the Thomas plan, but Field Marshal Keitel has testified that this plan was theoretical and that it was never made operative.

c. Somewhat parallel to the Office of War Economy, and certainly duplicating some of its functions, was the Four Year Plan organization established by Hitler in 1936 and headed by Goering. Within this ministry there was a general council which coordinated the armed forces' demands for labor and materials with those of industry and civilian consumers. This agency also made estimates of the economic resources of the Reich and calculated the capacity of industry for the production of armaments.

d. In 1940 the Ministry of Armament and Munitions was founded with Todt as first minister. This agency was responsible for establishing the broad outlines of the armament production program and securing the necessary raw materials. It functioned in parallel with the Funk Economic Ministry and coordinated with the Goering Four Year Plan. (The continued operations of this agency are explained in Section 3a).

e. From the time the OKW was established in 1938 until 1942 the general administration of armament production by the armed forces was in the hands of the Regional Armament Office. This agency provided the regional controls throughout the Reich with Regional Armament Inspectorates and Sub-Regional Armament Inspectorates. These regional and local offices worked with the manufacturers securing supplies and labor, administering priorities and local distribution of critical items and, after the air attacks began, they determined the extent to which armament factories should be repaired or dispersed after bombing.

f. The actual orders for armaments were placed by the contract officers of the three armed services in the Army, for example, by the Weapons Office of the Army High Command. These offices laid down requirements specifying the desired performance and quantities of munitions, and were responsible for inspecting, accepting and paying for armaments. In the Navy High Command and Air Force High Command similar contract offices served the Navy and Air Force. Until February 1944 the Air Force High Command procured not only aircraft but also flak artillery and ammunition. This subject is covered in greater detail in a study "Control of Armament Production in Germany", which is a reference note 1 to this report in the files of the Munitions Division, US Strategic Bombing Survey.

2. Technical assistance.

a. During the pre-war period military officers of the Reich sought the assistance of leading industrial technicians and together they worked on designs for new weapons. These were field tested both in Germany and in the Spanish Civil War. By such efforts, modern tanks, anti-tank guns, aeroplanes, submarines and battlecruisers were wrought under an economy fighting its way out of a depression. Figures are lacking on the quantities produced but the expansion of the Army in 1935 from 10 divisions to an estimated 39 divisions in 1937 and something more than 100 divisions at the outbreak of war, with comparable expansion of the naval and air forces, attests to the considerable accomplishments attained by the fall of 1939.

3. Expansion of production facilities

a. It is apparent from the testimony of Albert Speer that, due to the progress under the Four Year Plan, Germany in 1939 had reached a state of economic mobilization which was exceptional for a country not yet at war. Basically the High Command knew what the ordnance producing capacities of Germany's industries were and they knew the availability of the required raw materials. Moreover, the large ordnance producing companies were already engaged in the production of guns and shells. While the extent of this production has not become available for assessment, it is apparent that any production during peace, even if, of insignificant volume by war standards, will accumulate a substantial reserve.

b. The three largest concerns in the field of ordnance manufacture were Friedrich Krupp, Rheinmetall-Borsig A.G., and Bochumer Verein. The Krupp concern, particularly the Krupp plant in Essen, was the dominant company concerned with the development of heavy guns and shells. Rheinmetall-Borsig was the second most important developer of ordnance materials, particularly in the field of flak artillery. The Bochumer Verein was capable of extensive munitions manufacturing and during the course of the war became the largest single producer of artillery barrel forgings. Plant studies have been made of two of the Krupp plants, two of the Rheinmetall-Borsig plants, and of the Bochumer Verein.

c. With the single exception of the construction of the Hermann Goering plant at Brunswick, neither the field investigation nor the study of German records has revealed the construction of new ordnance producing plants, or even of substantial new shops planned for the exclusive manufacture of guns and shells at existing plants. However, machine tool production expanded and many plants which ultimately began ordnance production acquired increased stocks of machine tools. This expansion was encouraged by a government decree in 1935 which authorized companies, subject to government approval, to write off in one, two, or three years, the cost of new equipment. Dr. Karl Lange, head of the main committee on machine tools, has stated that the increased rate of manufacture of these began as early as 1933, and that the production of specialized machine tools for war purposes was begun in 1939.

d. Interesting evidence of the certain preparations which Germany was making for war, and the expectancy which they had that the country might be subjected to bombing, can be cited from the personal experience of a member of this team. He was visiting the Krupp Grusonwerk in Magdeburg in September 1937 and was being shown about by a plant official well known to him personally and professionally. During the visit he was accorded a full inspection of the plant and all its manufacturing processes except for several large sections where he was told "toys" were being made for the Wehrmacht. Also, he observed the construction of a large bomb shelter under the administration building, and the plant official readily admitted its anticipated function. Moreover, he observed throughout the northern part of Germany that blackout practices were being staged, and signs were posted in the streets, hotels, and factories of the location of the nearest air raid shelters.

4. Stockpiling of raw materials

a. The primary raw material of ordnance production is finished steel. During this period Germany had reserve stocks of steel, but the problem of the Reich officials was to whom they should be allocated and how to increase the reserve. General Thomas when interrogated at Falkenstein/Taunus stated that the 1938 average monthly steel production of 1,900,000 metric tons was divided as follows:

b. Tonnage of steel stocks on hand during this period were estimated by Thomas at 12,000,000 metric tons, which fell to about three or four million tons at the end of 1942. Beyond this it is known that ordnance producing companies accumulated reserve stocks of rubber, nickel, tungsten, copper, and other commodities, but again these do not appear to have been large stocks, and they were equal only to the requirements of a war of short duration.

c. A memorandum prepared for Hermann Goering, dated 29 August 1939 and entitled "Raw Material Situation in Case of Mobilization" estimates the reserves of raw materials essential to armament production as follows:

d. Undoubtedly, the German leaders had considerable confidence in technological advances that would reduce the dependence of the country on foreign raw materials. In addition, there was the general opinion that any war engaged in would be quick and decisive without need for great accumulated reserves.

5. Dispersal and relocation of plants

a. No dispersal, relocation, or conversion of non-ordnance plants to ordnance production is evident for this period. The single trend in this direction was the wider distribution of orders for components to small companies throughout Germany which resulted in decentralizing the-manufacture of such components. The building of the Hermann Goering plant at Brunswick was an exception to this trend.

6. Steps taken to reduce dependence upon imports

a. The Four Year Plan organization had been established to reduce the dependence of Germany on imports of raw materials, and within the controlled economy of the Reich it must have been effective in some degree. Just how effective is difficult to measure because any nation entering a war needs more of everything than is available. It is axiomatic that no military force ever admits to having enough supplies, but the very fact that Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland indicates that he thought the Reich adequately prepared for anticipated needs.

b. Beyond the evidences of stockpiling and the confidence which the German leaders had in technological substitutes for essential raw materials, one specific illustration can be cited of how it was hoped to overcome dependence on imports during the war. Steel cartridge cases had been developed in World War I. While they were not wholly satisfactory, further improvements were made in manufacturing methods during this pre-war period, and conversion was made to a general use of steel cartridge cases to save brass and avoid a future shortage.

7. Training of labor and technicians

a. The pre-war labor requirements for ordnance manufacture were insignificant. No program for the specific training of the additional labor or technicians that would be required in the war expansion was uncovered. However, the existing programs of training in German industry with apprentices in the plants, and with plant-operated trade schools, provided a continuously available facility for training personnel for ordnance assignments. When a non-ordnance plant was to be converted in part or in whole to ordnance production, key personnel were selected for six to eight weeks of specialized instruction in an ordnance plant before taking over a supervisory assignment in their own plant. The later developments of taking workers from non-essential industries, of recruiting labor in occupied countries, of securing the release of essential labor from the armed forces, of using high school students as part or full time workers, and of impressing subject peoples and prisoners of war, all appear to have been the extemporizations of necessity rather than the results of any advanced planning.

8. Importance of this industry to the German war potential

a. The ordnance industry is, of course, basic to any country that wages war: it forges the tools of battle without which no army can fight. In peacetime it constitutes a drain on the economy, but in time of war it becomes the major industry of a nation, dominating the entire civilian economy. The demands upon the ordnance industry are very extensive. The manufacture of a great variety of items, a flexibility of production scheduling that will permit of changes and adjustments to changing requirements, and the development of new and superior equipment are among the problems which have to be faced.

b. The largest single material requirement of ordnance is steel. Before the war nearly 40 percent of the German steel production, about 800,000 metric tons, was used for armaments. Of this about half the requirements were for weapons and ammunition. Later an even larger proportion of the total steel output was demanded. Another major requirement of ordnance manufacture is machine tool equipment - much of it specialized and of no use for civilian production. In the five year period 1934 through 1938 the domestic sale of machine tools in Germany increased more than two and one half times. Inevitably a substantial portion of these tools was used for the manufacture of ordnance.

c. Most significant of all is the amount of manpower that later became necessary to armament manufacturing. In 1943-1944 it is estimated that apart from those in the armed services 20 percent of the gainfully employed workers of Germany were engaged in production for war. Thus it is apparent that a large share of the resources of a country go into ordnance in time of war.

III. Performance And Changes In Planning Up To Combined Bomber Offensive Mid-Summer 1943.

1. Changes in government supervision:

a. For the first two years of the war (1939-1940) Germany had no difficulty covering requirements for ordnance production. Not only was the expenditure of munitions low because of the speed with which the German Army rolled over its opposition; but also, the capture of enemy guns and ammunition and the acquisition of additional stocks of raw materials and manufacturing facilities in the occupied countries considerably extended the reserves already accumulated. This gain was partly offset by the increased problems of the manufacture, distribution and stockpiling of a greater variety of sizes, since most of this equipment was of a caliber different from the German standard.

b. In the late summer and fall of 1941 according to the testimony of General von Halder, Hitler regarded the war against Russia won, and in his optimism went so far as to order the discontinuance of all munitions production in Germany. This instruction does not appear to have been followed but, appreciable cutbacks were made in the ordnance production program. During the winter of 1941-1942 the German army met its first set-back, and with the lengthening lines of supply in Russia, in the Balkans, and in North Africa, the reserve of ordnance materials was depleted.

c. Early in 1942 the military situation forced Hitler to insist on a great all around expansion of armaments output. Following the death of Todt in an air crash, Albert Speer was made Relchminister for armaments and munitions and succeeded Todt as Commissioner-general for armament tasks in the Four Year Plan organization. Speer promptly effected several needed changes. He arranged for the transfer of the Regional Armament Office from the Army High Command to his ministry. He secured the active assistance of top industry technicians and executives through the creation of the Main Committees and the Main Rings. Together with Milch and Koerner, he formed the Central Planning Committee to provide for the allocation of raw materials. With these measures the industrial production of ordnance items was accelerated and production increased steadily until it reached a peak in the summer of 1944.

2. Ordnance production indices

a. It is very difficult to select an index which truly reflects the production of the ordnance industry. Tonnage is not a wholly satisfactory index in that many complicated small items such as fuses require more expenditure of effort and costly material than shells or bombs, which bulk large in weight. The number of pieces produced is unsatisfactory because of the great variety of weapons shells and components. Man-hours or reichsmarks cannot be utilized advantageously because available reports of the government and of the manufacturing plants do not consistently provide either of these statistics. Moreover, because of the many variants in the calculations of man hours, and because cost was not a primary factor with many small high-cost producers participating in the overall production, neither of these would give an accurate estimate.

b. The Speer ministry overall production figures are given in units and present a clear picture for individual items, but unfortunately do not cover the period before 1941. The Quartermaster General listed ammunition by shipping weights, including containers, of all complete rounds of a ammunition accepted by the army. Shells and ammunition are usable only when sufficient guns are available. This together with the fact that the amount of steel used in shells is a major part of that required for all ordnance, suggests that the Quartermaster General index is a fairly satisfactory measure of production.

c. Another set of index figures prepared by the Planning Office, main division, statistical department gives the production in percent based on January-February 1942 production of most are also included overall ordnance items by groups. There indices of weapons, ammunition and other categories of armament products. (Exhibit E, page 1) The exact statistical method used in arriving at the group and overall indices is not relevant to the report, but in general the graphs follow very closely those prepared from the Speer production records. (Exhibit B)

d. In contrast to this, any figures of planned production are extremely unreliable, as are figures of steel allocations for munitions, particularly before 1942. For example, at that time an individual manufacturer would make a request for the amount of steel he felt was necessary to meet a certain production schedule. The local ordnance office in relaying that requirement increased the amounts just to be on the safe side. At the Army High Command, to get a fair share of available material in competition with other branches of the service, the declared requirements were further increased. Thus the final requests for materials were out of all proportion to actual needs. It was stated by Albert Speer that on one occasion the requests for the allocation of copper exceeded the entire world production. As long as there were sufficient supplies of the necessary raw materials, the allocations were made on a basis proportionate to the requested amounts, but not equal to them nor yet truly representative of requirements for anticipated production.

e. Thus there are two facts in consequence; first, the German ordnance industry received larger allocations of materials than needed, so individually and collectively, the manufacturers were able to accumulate a reserve of raw material stock (which was later a cushion to increased requirements). Second, under the existing conditions there was no particular need to conserve materials (which left considerable room for economy later when the need arose).

f. The figures for planned production are similiarily confused. Several instances may be cited to illustrate this. In a stenographic report of a conference with Hitler, dated 19 May 1942 (Speer, Hamburg documents), the steel for munitions in the first quarter of 1942 is cited at 190,000 tons per month, and the possibility of reaching 320,000 tons for the third quarter is suggested. Hitler expressed his belief that when the steel used for ammunition reached 350,000 tons per month it would be sufficient. Neither of these production figures were yet they represent the so-called planned production. Several times, in the case of weapons, when production figures were presented to Hitler for approval, he arbitrarily increased the program on many items. The Armed Forces, of course would not say they did not need the weapons, so the program stood an arbitrarily determined, and with unattainable requirements.

The statistical data, as well as information collected from interrogations are further confused by the fact that steel quantities for ordnance are sometimes designated as amounts of raw steel and at other times as contingent weights. The former is the steel ingot weight required. The latter is the rolled, forged, or billet weight required for a given product. The ratio between the two weights is about three to two.

h. Exhibit D fig 2 shows the Quartermaster General Index from Volume 15 of Speer's Flensburg documents and the contingent weight allocated from ammunition as it is given by the Main Committee of Munitions in their yearly production record for 1944. It will be noted that after 1942 when Speer became Reichsminister for armament and Munitions the conformity between the two curves is very close. The poor correlation between the yearly averages of 1940 and 1941 indicates the error of considering allocations for this period as planned production. The Quartermaster General Index in 1941 shows the extreme drop in munitions production occasioned by Hitler's optimism with respect to an early victory, and his consequent order to reduce armament production. The very rapid rise of the Index in 1942 follows the military reverses of the Russian campaign in the winter of 1941-1942.

3. Creation of new production facilities and dispersals

a. As the Russian, Balkan and North African campaigns required more ordnance materials, additional manufacturing facilities were established by conversion of plants in the textile, woodworking and other industries capable of light manufacturing. The textile Plants of Germany were virtually vacated to make available labor and space for munitions manufacturing, while such textile manufacturing as was continued was transferred to France. Again, this brought about a wider geographic distribution of the ordnance industry throughout Germany. Artillery guns and large shells continued to be manufactured only by the established heavy industrial companies. The construction of the Hermann Goering works at Brunswick-Hallendorf in 1939-1940 can be explained as an effort to utilize domestic low-grade iron ores, reducing the need for importing ore. However, the construction of the shell plant at this location in 1943 capable of forging 745,000 shells a month of sizes 75 mm and larger is an outstanding exception to the general German pattern of ordnance expansion. Only minor evidence was found of the dispersal of existing plants during this period. To illustrate, in 1943 Krupp-Essen dispersed its motor truck division in anticipation of bombing.

4. Acquisition of production facilities by conquest:

a. Little in the way of ordnance manufacture is believed to have been accomplished beyond the borders of Germany. The Germans preferred to retain this production within the Reich with an increased emphasis on essential civilian goods manufacturing in the occupied countries. Of course, full use was made of the Skoda facilities in Czechoslovakia. The Germans forced the French Government to reopen their nationally-owned powder-making plants, but little production resulted.

b. The Skoda combine was an important factor both because of the technical development provided by their research staff and because of the volume of their output. Production figures have been obtainable only for the principal plant in Pilsen. The output of this shop in guns and shells over 7.5 cm was as follows:

5. Reserve stocks of ordnance:

a. The reserves of weapons and shells were negligible. No statistics have become available to demonstrate this, but it is apparent from the interrogation of Spear, Saur, Keitel, Dunnhausen and other responsible officials that from the time of the reverses on the Russian and African fronts, the armies had prompt and continuing need for ordnance as fast as it could be manufactured. Speer boasts of how he cut the delivery time.

b. The significant things to note at this period are:

(1) There were no indications of imperative shortages from the armies at the fronts. True, the generals and the officials of the Military High Command were called for more of everything, but the armies were reasonably well supplied except for shells on the Eastern front. Here the Russians were using artillery drum fire and the required retaliation by the Germans brought about a higher consumption of shells.

(2) The production of all ordnance items was rising steadily.

(3) With all the problems of meeting production bottlenecks, and of distributing all material that could be made available to each armament program according -to its priority, there is nothing to show that the Germans could not have caught up with their deficits if later setbacks had not occured.

(4) There were no indications that production for one branch of the service, or for even a single type of armament, was accomplished at the expense of reducing or dislocating the production for another branch of service, or for another type of weapon.

c. No compilation has become available of the stocks of ordnance that came into the-possession of the Germans as a result of their conquests. It is known that they successfully rebored Russian artillery pieces to German sizes. Also, French and Czech weapons were used considerably, but officials pointed out that an extra burden on shell and ammunition manufacture, and on distribution and supply to the army resulted.

6. Results of raids prior to combined bomber offensive

a. As will be seen from a study of the several ordnance plant reports, bombing raids prior to the summer of 1943 had no appreciable effect on production totals. Moreover, the Speer records show that production of the entire industry increased without interruption from 1941 through 1943, except for a slight recession in the summer of 1943, somewhat comparable to a similar restriction of production in the US during the same period when the rapid previous increases exceeded the current use of ammunition. No evidence has bee found to indicate that the reduced production during this period was the result of bombing the industry.

7. Steps taken in anticipation of intensified bombing:

a. No major air raid precautionary measures appear to have been taken by the ordnance manufacturing concerns during this period. More air raid shelters were built at the plants and some plants were protected with flak or camouflage but no concerted program of protection for ordnance plants was instituted.

b. Most significant however was the steady increase in production of flak artillery and ammunition. Both Speer and Keitel credit Hitler with perceiving the importance of adequate flak. Moreover, the trend of increased output continued right through 1944 as is evidenced by the following tables from Vol 15 of the Speer Documents. Note the increasing emphasis beginning in 1943 on the production of 12.8 cm flak to provide defense against high-altitude bombers:

*Note: The production of 8.8 cm ammunition did not increase during the three year period although the production of 8.8 cm flak artillery increased 250 percent. The exact reason for this has not been determined.

IV. Performance And Changes in Planning During the Combined Bomber Offensive.

1. Changes in priority position of ordnance production

a. The manufacture of weapons and shells was of high priority all during this period. From time to time the manufacture of other munitions such as V-1 and V-2 weapons, prefabricated submarines, varying models of tanks and a variety of items for the Air Force were afforded highest priority, but this preference did not preclude sufficient supplies and manufacturing facilities being made available to keep ordnance manufacture at a very high level.

b. The emphasis on the importance of different types of weapons and shells shifted with the progress of the war. For example, the manufacture of flak artillery and shells, particularly of the larger 10.5 cm and 12.8 cm dimensions, was increasingly pressed all through 1943 and 1944, even in 1945 when most ordnance production was dropping precipitously the production of flak shells was maintained.

c. Small arms production was twice moved higher on the priority list: first in the fall of 1943 after the reverses on the Eastern and Mediterranean fronts and in the last half of 1944 when retreats were exhausting infantry weapon reserves at the same time that similar equipment was needed for the newly formed Home Guards.

d. The Germans thought for a period that designs of infantry bazookas had great merit and production was pressed from November 1943 to June 1944 only to fall off sharply when the weapon failed to achieve its expected high performance. A similar and more rapid crest and fall of production came in the fall of 1944 when the Nebelwerfer rocket launchers were rushed as an easily manufactured defense weapon only to strike a bottle-neck in the production of rocket shells. (Exhibit B, Pages 3 and 6)

e. In the spring of 1945 when defeat was imminent and all production was falling off rapidly, an attempt was made to maintain as high a level of ammunition production as possible by reducing the priority standing of gun manufacture to the very end of the list.

2. Production and discussion of charts:

a. The performance of the ordnance industry during the combined bomber offensive from mid-1943 through 1944 can best be visualized by means or charts. Composite indices charts, while not strictly accurate give a general picture of overall production, but it must be recognized that it is impossible to express in one index and with anything more than a general meaning, such varied items as millions of rounds of smaIl arms ammunition and small numbers of large-calibre guns. Charts of related groups of items, however show trends of production according to types, and reflect changes in planning to meet current needs. Graphs of individual products would be so voluminous as to be impractical. Group index and other charts have been prepared from the production records of the Speer Ministry, which together with other related data appear in the exhibits of this report. A review of these charts can be very helpful in forming an impression of the. performance of the industry in 1943 and 1944.

b. One of the most significant facts shown is the remarkable and consistent yearly increase in production of practically all weapons and munitions from 1941 through 1944. The only exceptions to this are naval ammunition and heavy bombs (Exhibit B, pages 22-23). The former reached a peak in 1942 and the latter in 1943. The lowered production of these items reflects the changing pattern of the war for Germany, and it also released an estimated 75,000 tons of steel a month for other uses.

c. The production changes in ammunition as a whole are shown in the separate charts, (Exhibit B, page 13, Exhibit E, page 2 and Exhibit D, page 3). The first is a total in units of all shells 75 mm and larger as compiled from the Speer Ministry production records. These shells represent over half the tonnage of all ammunition. The second is the group index of armaments, giving the production as a percentage of a January-February 1942 base, and was prepared by the statistical division of the Planning Bureau. The third gives the contingent weights of steel required for munitions given by the Planning Bureau and the Quartermaster General's index of completed ammunition from the Speer Ministry statistics. It is remarkable how closely the contours of these curves correspond, all three showing a consistent yearly increase and a peak in September 1944. They also show that the rate of increase of the last half of 1943 did not continue through 1944, and that the major drop in production did not take place until December 1944.

d. It must be remembered that the production represented by these curves constituted over half the steel used in the armament industry. The chart in Exhibit D, page 3, gives the relationship between steel allocated to munitions and total steel production of Germany for the years 1943 and 1944. While previously allocations were not a very reliable index of munition manufacture, during this period allocations were changed from month to month as the production varied, either up or down, in order to prevent an unnecessary accumulation of stock. The curve of total steel production is based on figures from the German Steel Association and covers production of Germany only. This curve corresponds very closely to that in Exhibit B, page 1 which is based on the Speer Ministry statistics for steel production of Germany, including conquered countries. These graphs show very clearly that while steel production dropped considerably in August, 1944, an increasingly greater share of steel was diverted to munitions, but that a serious drop in munitions production did not occur until December 1944, or five months later. It can be noted (Exhibit A, pages 2-3) that the major loss of steel production was of Thomas steel, from which the majority of munitions were being made. After August, 1944, larger quantities of the higher quality open hearth steel had to be used for this purpose since the steel actually required for the munitions manufacture (contingent weight x 1.5) exceededthe entire production of Thomas steel.

e. In respect to weapons, the chart in Exhibit B, page 19 which represent total production (in units) of guns over 75 mm, as given in the Speer Ministry statistics, and that in Exhibit E, page 3, show substantially the same trend. Production over the four year period increased consistently. The fact that the highest single month of production was December 1944, shows that the reduced steel output had not yet been reflected in the delivery of finished guns. Two reasons for this are the long period of time required for the manufacture of weapons, and the relatively small amount of steel needed, weapons absorbing only one seventh of the total amount of steel required for munitions.

f. Another fact indicated by these charts is a slight though continuous decline in weapon production from July through November 1944. Since this corresponds, with the beginning of the combined bomber offensive, it might erroneously be attributed to that cause. The true explanation is as follows: the life of a gun barrel is quantitatively related to the amount of ammunition manufactured and the number of guns produced. In Germany the rate of gun production increased faster than the rate of shell production. From 1943 to 1944 gun production, including mortars, increased 57 percent and shell production, including mortar shells, increased only 33 percent. If mortars and mortar shells are excluded, the figures are 73 percent and 14 percent respectively, a much greater disparity. It was recognized and stated by Speer that the quantity of guns was disproportionate to the amount of ammunition available. Since ammunition production continued to rise until near the end of 1944 and the percent increase in guns for the year includes the period of restricted production, it is apparent that this was a step in planning and not a consequence of the bombing of the weapons industry.

g. It will be noted on the same chart (Exhibit B, page l) that a very remarkable increase in mortar production took place in December 1944. In 1944 the actual average increase over the previous year amounted to 25 percent. On the other hand, the increase in mortar production for 1944 was 136 percent over 1943, a condition just the reverse of that existing in regard to other guns and munitions. Thus an excessive supply of mortar shells existed simultaneously with a dearth of shells for the other weapons available. It was for this reason, and since smooth-bore mortars can be easily and quickly manufactured, that the output of mortars was doubled in December 1944.

h. Other charts of interest are given in Exhibit B, pages 14, 18 and 19, which show that production of light infantry ammunition, anti-aircraft ammunition, and hand grenades, which were all considered very essential, was maintained at a high level until the end of the year.

i. The chart on page 6, Exhibit A, graphically shows the spectacular drop in production of high explosives, in August 1944 as a result of bombing synthetic plants.

j. The overall index of armament production, page 2, Exhibit E, gives an approximate picture of the performance of the German ordnance industry from January 1942, when production started to rise, until the end of the war. This index, prepared by the statistical division of the Planning Bureau shows the average production for l944 as 277 percent above that of January-February 1942. A peak on this curve occurs at 322 percent in July 1944, after which it falls off rather rapidly.

3. Plant abandonment, relocation. new construction, dispersal:

a. As the combined bombing offensive reached intensity many adjustments of the physical manufacturing facilities were made. Few instances have been found of new plant construction, and in the main heavy ordnance manufacturing plants such as gun forge shops and heavy machine shops were continued on site with the best repairs and make-shifts attainable because transportation was becoming an increasing bottle-neck. In addition, these shops were relatively little damaged by direct air attacks.

b. An increasing number of orders was given to small former non-metal working plants, and many of these companies performed only a single operation such as threading one end of a shell. Each time the component was moved it aggravated the already serious transportation situation. Some shell turning and finishing plants were moved underground particularly in the Hanover and Harz Mountain areas, but details concerning these are not given because most of the plants never went into operation and none were of sufficient size to warrant plant studies.

c. Dispersal of the light manufacturing shops of the large ordnance producers was carried out to some extent. Sometimes the dispersed department of a plant continued operation under the management of the parent concern. In other cases machinery was dispersed to plants of other ownership to increase their capacity, or was used to convert non-armament plants to ordnance production. For example, the Krupp-Essen plant dispersed machinery to twenty-six different locations, most of which were in the immediate vicinity of Essen. In contrast the Rheinmetall-Borsig plant at Dusseldorf-Derendorf dispersed the gun machining shops to twenty-four locations scattered throughout Germany and Poland. However, no pre-arranged plan of dispersal was prepared for the industry, and each plant effected its own arrangements. If a shop was bombed the building and machinery were repaired if possible. Apart from this, undamaged machinery, repaired equipment, and such new or used equipment as could be obtained from other plants were set up in a location nearby. Usually this was in another building of the same concern that had up to than been used for a lower-priority operation than ordnance manufacturing. Less frequently the resort was to: removal to buildings of other companies; the construction of new buildings; or turning over such equipment as was still usable to another company.

4. Changes in processes, raw materials and finished products:

a. Relatively few changes of method or substitutions of materials were found in German ordnance manufacturing; and virtually no evidence of sacrifices in quality. In fact on the latter count the supervisors of the ordnance manufacturing program are to be criticized for permitting the manufacturers to finish many weapons to unnecessary stages of polish and perfection.

b. The major change in processing observed was the development in heat-treating and water-quenching the steel used in weapons to minimize the use of hardening alloys in high-quality steels. A less important change, but not until toward the end of the war, was a reduction in the amount of surface finishing on many weapons.

c. Shortage of tungsten brought about the discontinuance of tungsten carbide-cored ammunition. It also resulted in a definite shortage of tool and die steel as is exemplified by the fact that all through the war period most shells, even those as small as 75 mm were hot-nosed in cast-iron dies.

d. Two successful substitutions were made in the interest of conserving scarce raw materials. Steel casings replaced brass in much of the artillery shell production, and rotating bands of sintered iron powder were substituted for copper driving bands on shells.

e. Two persistent attempts at substitutions which were never brought to a satisfactory conclusion were the manufacture of shells of cast iron and shells of concrete with imbedded steel chips in the concrete six.

f. The only marked example of inferior manufacture found was an exceedingly crude rifle turned out for use by the Home Defense that was not produced in quantity until January and February 1945.

5. Factors contributing to production losses

a. Damage to plant facilities:

(1) It is difficult to generalize on how such the production of ordnance was affected by the bombing of the manufacturing plants because of the absence of any records. As previously stated, with more than five thousand plants scattered throughout Germany, and with ordnance manufacturing never having been a target, the great majority of plants were never bombed, nor affected to any great extent by area raids. At the same time, the ten plants which have been studied cannot be taken as representative of the industry because the also of the size of the plants and the degree to which they were subjected to bombing are both greater than the average for the industry.

b. Bombing of overall transportation systems:

(1) The bombing of the transportation system in 1943 had no appreciable effect on ordnance production, but in 1944 it was one of the major causes in the decline of ordnance manufacturing. The direct results were the interruption and stoppage of deliveries of raw material and component parts to the plants, and from the plants to the army. Train service became so erratic that priority ordnance components wore often moved long distances so by trucks, over-burdening another transportation sector. The indirect results were even more devasting: failure of coal deliveries through the bombing of the railroads and canals deprived manufacturers of coal, and consequently of gas necessary for heating billets for forgings. It was stated by Speer that only the very great density of rail lines in the Ruhr area prevented a much earlier collapse of transportation.

c. Bombing of gas supply:

(1) The most important single element in the final loss of production in the heavy ordnance industry was interruption of the gas supply necessary for heating billets for forging, heating shells for hot-nosing operations, and heat-treating guns, shells, bombs and many other miscellaneous items. For these purposes gas was used almost universally throughout Germany. It was distributed through an extensive system of above-ground pipelines generally referred to as the "gas grid", connecting all coke oven gas producing facilities with all the industrial consumers in the Reich. It was compulsory for all coke plants to furnish their entire output of gas to the grid, from which allocations were made to the individual users.

(2) There were two basic reasons for the loss of gas supplies to the ordnance industry: first, the bombing of rail and canal transportation which interfered with the delivery of coal to the coke plants, and second, direct damage to the coke plants and the gas grid system itself. It is believed that the first of these two causes was the primary factor in diminishing the gas supplies to the ordnance manufacturers. The plant study of the Hermann Goering works at Brunswick presents an ideal example in point since this plant included a coke plant, blast furnaces and ordnance producing shops. It was entirely dependent on its coal supply on barge service from the Ruhr through the Mittelland canal.

Disruption of this service by bombing near Munster, Rheine and Osnabruck prior to November 1944 so restricted the supply of coal that the coke ovens, which had been large suppliers of gas to the grid system, were shut down. The lack of coke caused the blast furnace to cease operation, and lack of gas caused the ordnance shops to shut down. Until that time there had been very little direct bomb damage to the plant and practically no interference with production.

d. Bombing of power networks:

(1) The bombing of power networks apart from the electric generating facilities within the ordnance plants themselves, had no great overall effect on ordnance production until the latter part of 1944. The reason for this is that the small ordnance producers without their own generating facilities had sufficient priority to get the power required as long as there was any supply. In turn, the larger ordnance manufacturers had their own power-generating facilities, which were largely unhit, and when they were, it was concomitant with other damage retarding production.

(2) An outstanding example of loss of power resulting in loss of production in the specific case of one of the plants studied occurred at Krupp-Essen. The destruction of their own power plants which produced about half of their requirements at the time, and of the Reisholz, RWE - Essen and Karnap power plants, which supplied the balance, resulted in an almost complete cessation of operations on 23 October 1943 when the plant could have operated at about 70 percent of capacity. Even at the end of the war, after many severe succeeding attacks, Krupp-Essen could have operated at about 50 percent of capacity had power been available.

(3) Speer report 27/1/45 (Vol 18 Flensburg Documents) stated that at the end of 1944 a total loss of power production capacity of 32.8 percent had been suffered as a result of bombing and lack of coal.

e. Bombing of steel industry:

(1) Since steel is the basic raw material for the manufacture of ordnance, it may logically be considered a desirable target for strategic bombing in order to cut off the raw material supply for arms and ammunition. The tonnage of steel used for guns is but a small proportion of the total amount of steel produced and the time required to manufacture guns may be as long as six months. On the other hand the amount of steel used for ammunition is the largest amount required for any single purpose, and the manufacture of ammunition from raw material to finished product is accomplished within a period of weeks. Thus it would seem that the effects of bombing the steel industry would not be reflected in gun production until a long time later, but that shell production would immediately be restricted while gun production did follow this pattern, the facts do not entirely justify this assumption in the case of shells.

(2) The tabulation in Exhibit D, page 1 shows the distribution of contingent weights of steel to the armament industry for the third quarter of 1944. The distribution of steel among the various categories certainly varied at different periods, but the approximate relation between guns, shells and total is fairly representative of the years 1943 and 1944. The requirements for shells were about half of the total. The charts, Exhibit D, pages 2 and 3, show amounts of contingent weights of steel allotted to munitions, and the percentage of the total steel production that they represent. During 1943 this averaged, about 12 percent. If ingot requirements were considered rather contingent weights, the proportion of total steel production would be approximately 18 percent. During early 1944, as ammunition production continued to rise, and steel output remained fairly constant, there was a further increase in percentage. After steel production started to decline in August, an increasingly greater share was allotted to munitions until by the end of the year approximately 45 percent of the German steel production went into ammunition alone. This, of course, was accomplished at the expense of other less critical requirements. By this time steel production was about one third that of the first half of 1944. Thus it is evident that the manufacture of steel must be very seriously curtailed, and for a fairly long period, before the full effects will be felt in ordnance production.

(3) It is interesting to note that most of the munitions in 1943 and 1944 were made of Thomas steel, the production of which fell off very rapidly in August 1944. From September 1944 on, the amount of steel used for ammunition actually exceeded the entire German output of Thomas steel.

(4) At none of the ordnance plants studied were there any indications of curtailed production for want of steel. It appeared that all the other influences such as direct damage, loss of fuel and power, and transportation were concomitant with the reduced supplies of steel, so that no evaluation of loss can be made on the basis of lack of this raw material. It must be said, however, that if there had been no other influences, a very serious steel shortage would have developed which would probably have had the same ultimate catastrophic results.

It is understood that the loss of steel production was predominantly due to indirect effects of bombing. Thus, in general, it appears that the necessary reduction in steel capacity by direct bombing in order to effectuate a desired constriction in ordnance production would require time and bombing effort far out of proportion to results likely to be achieved.

f. Bombing of explosives:

(1) One of the most outstanding indirect results of bombing was the influence on the production of explosives. Ammunition is the most important item of consumption, excluding food, in the list of army requirements; yet it is valueless if adequate supplies of powder and explosive are not available. In August 1944 the production of high explosives dropped to 65 percent of the July level, and at a time when the ammunition program was just reaching its peak (Exhibit A, page 6).

(2) The Speer document (Flensburg Document - Vol 18) report on the supply of nitrates describes the situation as of 6 December 1944. The production of nitrates had dropped to about 50 percent, largely as a result of loss by bombing of the synthetic plants of Leuna, Oppau, Heydebreck, and four plants in the Ruhr, which accounted for 75 percent of the production. As a consequence, explosive production fell so sharply that to fill available shells, the explosive was diluted with rock salt.

g. Absenteeism and lowered efficiency of labor:

(1) No overall figures are available, but absenteeism at individual plants studied varied from 10 percent to 20 percent during 1943 and 1944. Of this it is impossible to separate the normal rate from that caused by air raids. Probably, as in the US, the normal rate of absenteeism was between five percent and ten percent. At individual plants after heavy area raids, absenteeism was very high. The greatest loss of efficiency was not so much a result of a lowering of morale as of time lost during air raid alerts.

h. Area bombing with resulting effects on the health, and morale of labor:

(1) Up to 1944, area bombing as an influence on morals had no effects on ordnance production. In fact, the managers of the plants investigated indicated that through 1943 it improved morale and stiffened the will of the Germans to resist. Later it had fairly important effects resulting in absenteeism rates of from five percent to ten percent for time off to recover from air raid damage, and an equal loss of time within the plants from air raid alarms. There was at no time any evidence that the health of labor had been compromised as a result of air raids.

i. Top-level planning failures:

(1) It is difficult to bring a charge of bad planning against Speer and his associates in the administration of the armament program. It must be recognized that from the time Speer took over until the latter part of 1944 the production of ordnance increased in the face of continuous problems such as new construction, scarcity of materials, securing additional labor, transportation bottlenecks, and repairing raid damage. Speer's survey of production in 1944, dated 27 January 1945, (Vol 19, Flensburg Documents) states that ordnance production in 1944 was sufficient to equip completely 225 infantry divisions and 45 panzer divisions. This is not an insignificant volume of ordnance production. Until the last six months of the war the army was never critically short of weapons or shells, and if the Germans had been advancing instead of retreating with a resultant inevitable loss of ordnance supplies, there would probably have been enough ordnance equipment for any eventuality. However, it must be recognized that throughout the war the production of artillery ran ahead of shell manufacture, then an ammunition shortage developed in 1944, and that in fighting equipment outside the scope of this study, most particularly aircraft, shortages developed that materially contributed to the defeat of the German Armed Forces. How much of this shortage resulted from bad planning rather than circumstances beyond the control of Speer it is impossible to state.

6. Actual production loss compared with loss estimated from intelligence sources

a. Intelligence reports available to date concerning production losses at the ordnance-producing plants investigated are few in number, but generally they indicate a higher loss of production than was assessed by the investigating teams. Particularly in the earlier reports estimates of lost production were often related to visible building damage which is no legitimate index. This was especially true in the heavy industry sections ordnance where actual production losses were generally minor.

7. Air raid protection

a. The air raid protection systems in operation in the plants studied were well planned and appeared effective. The shelters were adequate; the plotting and warning systems sufficiently well controlled to permit minimum loss of working time; and the fire-fighting forces had little trouble with the magnesium incendiary bombs, although the phosphorus bombs proved more troublesome. The plant reports disclose a remarkably low loss life of personnel.

b. The shelters used were of many varieties and included underground tunnels as well as the concrete blockhouse types. Several companies ingeniously utilized unused smoke stacks as effective shelters.

c. The protection of machine facilities varied considerably, but the great majority of machines were not protected at all. Some critical installations such as main transformer stations were enclosed with heavy reinforced walls as much as six feet thick. Many generators were protected by concrete arches. When space was available in tool shops, individual machines were protected by loose brick walls approximately two feet thick and six feet high. Inverted "V" shaped concrete slabs were also used for this purpose. However, the loose construction of stacked bricks was reported to be more effective than rigid construction in absorbing bomb blasts.

8. Conversion of other plants to this industry:

a. Many former non-metal working plants were brought into production of ordnance components, particularly as subcontractors. These conversions were arranged by the local Armament Command and arose not only from the need of the Reich to maintain and increase ordnance production, but also came about by the application of small-plant owners for conversion to keep their plants busy. Many these small plants were unable to obtain the materials needed for their normal manufacture, or they were losing their labor to more essential industries. They therefore sought ordnance manufacturing to keep their shops going. Estimates of officials interrogated indicate that upwards of 5,000 plants were engaged in the manufacture of guns, ammunition, and component parts during the last year of the war.

9. Use of women, slave-labor, and prisoners of war:

10. Diversion of labor from lower priority industries:

a. Extensive and continuing diversion of labor was made from low-priority industries to armament production, particularly in the last two years of the war. In 1944, approximately 80 percent of the labor diverted from other industries was for replacements in the armament industry. This represented a labor turnover of 35 percent including those called up for military service.

V. Summary of attacks

1. The target system:

a. The ordnance industry was never selected as a target on the priority lists for Allied air attacks, and it could not reasonably have been so selected unless it had been decided to bomb all, or particular geographic groups of industrial plants. The plants making ordnance were so numerous, were so widely scattered throughout Germany, and were so relatively small in size and generally similar in appearance to other surrounding industrial buildings that identification from the air was difficult. In addition, despite the high order of the Allied intelligence, which afforded reasonably accurate knowledge of the very large ordnance manufacturing companies this information was not factual to a point of telling which buildings of these larger plants were used for gun and shell making. Nor could such identification be made with reasonable accuracy by the interpretation of air photos.

2. Attacks on ordnance targets:

a. It is not possible to itemize the air attacks which were made against ordnance manufacturing targets or to summarize the tonnage or types of bombs that were dropped on these plants. The intelligence and statistical records of the Allied AF did not segregate ordnance manufacturing as a classification. Much of the bombing of ordnance plants resulted from area raids on, or spillovers from raids on targets of higher priority.

3. Vulnerability of the ordnance industry:

a. The ordnance industry of Germany absorbed a very large part of the productive effort of the country. It called for the manufacture of such dissimilar things as small fuse parts and heavy guns. The first type of product was made on relatively light, high-production equipment with a large production concentrated within a small space. The geographical distribution of this type of ordnance manufacture was very wide. The light equipment required, and the fact that it was usually closely spaced within the plants, made it vulnerable to damage by small bombs both explosive and incendiary. However, the small size of the plants, their great number and distribution, and the impossibility of complete and accurate identification made this section of the ordnance industry a poor strategic target. On the other hand, the heavy shops forging and machining guns, while not so numerous or so widely scattered throughout Germany, used heavy equipment vulnerable primarily to heavy bombs. In addition, such operations were carried on in single buildings of large steel plants, and specific intelligence identification proved difficult. Thus it can be said that this type of ordnance manufacture did not present a suitable target for strategic bombing either. Between these two extremes ordnance manufacture varied tremendously as to type of product and equipment, size and number of plants, and concentration or dispersal of units. Much of this varied ordnance manufacture was bombed in area raids, and in attacks on other targets, but no general assessment can be made within the limits of this ordnance report as to what was accomplished. The conclusion is obvious: despite the great importance of ordnance manufacturing for the German ability to wage war, the ordnance industry was too amorphous to be made a target entity for Allied strategic bombing.

4. Vulnerability of other plants supplying the industry

a. Probably more vulnerable to strategic bombing than ordnance manufacturing are the materials and facilities essential to it. The most important component in the supply chain of ordnance manufacturing is finished steel. However, to the extent of the observations of the ordnance team, steel manufacturing facilities are not a good target. The steel plants, while fewer in number and more distinguishable from the air for bombing, are like the heavy ordnance manufacturing plants in their relative invulnerability to anything but direct hits or near misses by heavy bombs.

b. As discussed in a previous section (4e) the bombing of transportation, power networks, and the gas grid all had very material and sustained effects on ordnance production. It is the opinion of this team that each of these facilities appears to be better target for strategic bombing than ordnance manufacture, but this judgment must be balanced with the findings of the teams reporting on these targets.

c. Powder and explosives manufacturing does not affect the production of ordnance, but there is a definite relation between the two in end-product use. No study has been made by this team of explosives or ammunition manufacture but it is apparent. from the analysis of German records that a serious shortage developed in the mid-summer of 1944. The deficiency arose from a shortage of nitrates which in turn resulted from the air attacks on the synthetic plants.

VI. Conclusions

l. Loss in production resulting from attacks

a. It is not possible to state, or make a reasonable estimate of the production of ordnance items that was lost to the German war effort as a result of Allied air attacks. Actual production increased each year until the last half of 1944 but it did not keep pace with planned production. (3b), planned figures were often arrived at arbitrarily and more nearly represented production goals, therefore no positive evaluation is possible.

b. The monthly production lags of 1941, 1942 and most of 1943 cannot be attributed to bombing. The rate of increase in the latter half of 1943 did not, however continue through 1944 and it is undoubtedly true that if it had not been for the Allied air attacks the production figures for the last 18 months of the war would have been higher.

c. The extent of the production losses resulting from the bombing of the 10 major plants investigated may not be considered typical of the industry because these plants were subjected to much heavier raids than most of the other ordnance factories.

2. Most effective and economical type of direct attack.

a. The ordnance industry of Germany was not a good target system for strategic bombing (V-1). However, from the plants which have been studied these generalizations can be made concerning the bombing of individual plants:

(1) The production of plants engaged in light ordnance manufacture can be curtailed most effectively with medium weight bombs (minimum of 500 lbs) fuzed to explode at floor level to attain a maximum blast effect on machinery. Bombs which primarily damage buildings are less effective although the results are of material consequence through the damage caused by the falling structure as well as the subsequent exposure of the machinery to weather and dirt. Incendiaries may be effective, even though the buildings are of fire-proof construction, for the damage that may be done to motors, electrical controls and wiring. These incendiary bombs should be of the oil or some other type which will splatter and spread fire over a wide area rather than make a small pool of concentrated heat as magnesium bombs do. Time bombs with fuzes set for ten minutes to several hours may well be included to impede the firefighters. Follow-up raids will be effective in discouraging efforts at recuperation, especially improvisations set up to protect machines from the weather. To keep the plant effectively out of production, the repeat attacks should be made at two to three month intervals.

(2) Plants engaged in heavy ordnance production with forge shops, or with large lathes and boring mills, should be attacked with large bombs. Delayed fuzes to provide for the explosion at or below the floor level are recommended. Because the machines are more widely spaced than in the light manufacturing plants a greater density of bomb coverage is necessary in order to secure direct hits or near misses that will damage or disturb the foundations of these big machines. Incendiaries are of little effect here. Building damage will be of minor consequence. If the character of the target is such that the incoming supply of electricity or gas can be effectively bombed, damage to it may more seriously curtail production than direct hits on the plant.

3. Most successful type of indirect attacks

a. Indirect attacks had the greatest effect on the curtailment of ordnance manufacture. The facilities or supplies impaired are indicated roughly in the order of their relative importance.

(1) Transportation. The increasing difficulties of transportation impaired the deliveries of components between the dispersed ordnance plants and scattered sub-contractors, The bombing of the railroads and canals reduced the supplies of coal reaching the big industrial plants. With less coal, less coke and gas were produced in the coke ovens which in turn impaired the heating facilities so necessary to ordnance and steel manufacture. In the last six months of the war the interruption of delivery of completed ordnance materials for the armies became very serious.

(2) The gas grid and sources of gas for heating. Gas was an essential fuel for heating steel billets for forging. While the gas grid was never bombed as a specific target, area raids and plant raids caused considerable damage to the gas lines. Few coke plants were seriously damaged, but these and the gas grid were the source and distribution lines respectively of the essential gaseous fuel. Serious damage to either was reflected in loss of ordnance production.

(3) Explosives. Air raids reduced the supplies of nitrates necessary for explosive production just when shell production was reaching its wartime peak. This did not directly affect ordnance production but it diminished the effect of the increased shell supplies.

(4) The manufacture of steel. Indirect and direct effects of bombing reduced the production of steel particularly in 1944, and ordnance manufacturing was maintained only by according a higher priority for the steel available.

4. Recuperative techniques.

a. The dispersal of plant manufacturing to less central and better protected locations is regarded as the best recuperative technique. In Germany, however, ordnance manufacturing was decentralized to too great a degree. Frequently only one step of processing was accomplished at each location. This extended inventories, burdened transportation and often resulted in delays in finishing lines due to a single missing component or operation.

5. Protective measures.

a. The protective measures taken in the ordnance plants studied were not very successful.

b. Some of the latest German industrial buildings were built with brick walls laid in such a way that in every four square feet of wall the area one brick was omitted. This provided holes in the walls which were destined to relieve blast pressure against the wall, but from observations made by this team at Hanomag, where this type of construction was used, and from statements by company officials, this appeared to be an unreliable expedient. Within the plants the placing of loosely stacked brick walls about two feet thick around vital machinery was observed to be an effective protective measure. These walls withstood the blast better than solid masonry shields.

c. Underground plants were being built for ordnance manufacturing in Hanover-Brunswick and the Harz Mountains area but none had began operations. Judging from the statements of officials of Hermann Goering and Krupp-Grusonwerk the major difficulty with underground operations concerns labor; the workers rebelled against them. Apart from this the limitations of space, congestion at the entrances, and the damage to machines from dust and dampness are major reasons for avoiding underground operations.

This information shown on the graphs is taken from the Speer Documents (Flensburg), Statistical Report - Armament and War Production, Vol. 15, Pages 1-10, dated February 1945, and covers average monthly production for the years 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, and actual monthly production from July 1943 through February 1945 for the items listed in the index below.

Note 1: Taken from Planungsamt Records for the Emergency Program, found at Dustbin, the date of preparation was apparently November 1944.
Note 2: Contingent weight is the billet or rough steel weight, approximately 70% of weight of raw steel.

From the Speer Documents (Flensburg, Vol. 16)
Indexziffern der Deutschen Rüstungs Endfertigung (Indices figures of German Armament Production)
Prepared by: Speer, Planning Offices, Main Division, Statistical Department (Planungsamt, Hauptabteilung, Planslatistik)

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