Baptism in the Northwoods

SS-Kampfgruppe Nord at Salla, 1941

by Jason Long

On 6 June it was ordered to the Rovaniemi area of Finland for expansion into a Brigade and participation in the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. The Kampfgruppe had only recently concentrated near Kirkenes and had to march the length of the Arctic Ocean Highway from Kirkenes on the Arctic Ocean to Rovaniemi not far from the Baltic Sea. By 10 June its forward elements had reached their destination with other elements of the new brigade arriving over the next week or so. Elements began moving towards the Soviet frontier near Salla on 17 June along the single road allocated to Nord.

The artillery regiment, one 20mm battery of the flak battalion, and most of the supporting services were formed in early 1941 in Germany and shipped directly to Finland shortly before Barbarossa began.

Demelhuber was not impressed with Nord's readiness for combat and excerpts from his report to Generalleutenant Fige, commander of XXXVI. Armeekorps are presented below:

Evaluation of the Commander:

On 17 June 1941 I was named to take charge of the SS Division Nord. The division was rapidly assembled in the last minute with the artillery being attached at the very last instant.

The first impression that I received was that the foundation of the unit, the independent and independently-trained elements, was standing on very weak feet and lacking in full combined unit development.

Officers and troopers cannot be held reproachable; they have no opportunity to undergo careful, detailed training under experienced leadership. The bulk of the commanders and company leaders are reserve officers with little or no troop or combat command experience in modern warfare. Even the battalion commanders, despite their abilities, are not appropriate for the leadership tasks required by modern infantry operations and the corresponding weapons.

The artillery spent sometime at Jüterbog, but has not fired in conjunction with infantry. Vice-versa the infantry has not had the opportunity to work with the artillery. The anti-tank gun crews have done no live firing; the same for the light mortars (crews) and the greater part of the Flak batteries. Exercises, in mixed formations have not yet taken place. The unit is not in battle-ready condition.

The supply section of the Division was assembled at the last instant in Stettin and does not have the proper leadership framework which it must possess to supply fighting troops. Because of that, motorization has suffered and the independent units have not made it possible to standardize supplies. The replacement of supplies is difficult. The trucks for the artillery are not equivalent to those used for a standard German motorized division (French type Somua and assorted others).

The infantry regiments can only deploy one light infantry gun platoon each.

The personnel quality is good, some parts very good. The NCOs need more schooling. Specialist training has been very wanting. I have (personally) sent this evaluation report to the commanding General.

Given the opportunity, the Division can be made fully ready for action, after some new reformation and replacement of the shortages with two or three months at a good training camp for building up.

The Division Commander,
Demelhuber
SS-Brigadeführer and Generalmajor.

The response to the above message was a polite thank you and a I'm sure-you-will-do-your best admonition. No special considerations were given to the Div. Nord for its obvious weaknesses.

The order to attack didn't arrive until 24 June, but the actual date of the attack wasn't set until 1 July. Nord was to make a frontal attack on the Soviet positions in front of Salla while the 169. Infanterie Division attacked on their northern flank and the 6th Finnish Infantry Division was to drive deep behind the Soviet 122d Rifle Division to Allakurtti from the southern flank. Nord was reinforced with most of Panzer Abteilung 40 while Artillerie Abt. 496 and 520 provided indirect fire support. Stukas of IV.(St.)/LG 1 were to suppress Soviet artillery positions before the assault.

This opening barrage had some effect on the defenders, but more importantly set much of the forest on fire, which severely degraded visibility for the Stukas and artillery observers. The fire also prevented the regimental heavy weapons from supporting the infantry with direct fire on Soviet positions. The infantry was unable to advance very far and the attack was called off by the afternoon of 2 July with Nord's infantry dispersed over much of its sector. To show that Nord's difficulties weren't entirely of its own making, the 169. Infanterie Division's regiment adjoining Nord had been rebuffed by the Soviets and had made only negligble progress.

It regrouped during the 2nd and 3rd in preparation for the resumption of the attack on the 4th. However, the Soviets struck first at 0100 on the 4th with tanks in SS-IR 7's sector, but they were repulsed with the aid of a flak batterie. However, the commander of I./SS-IR 7, Hstuf. Franz Augsberger, reported that Soviet tanks had broken through his positions. This report caused a panic among the men of 1., 3., and 4. Kompanie who retreated to find cover from the advancing tanks. They fell back at least a thousand meters to find the regimental motorcycle platoon, which had been sent forward to investigate the report. Fully persuaded of their impending doom by the panic-stricken SS men, the motorcyclists confirmed the report and most all of I./SS-IR 7, including the battalion staff, abandoned their positions and headed to the saftey of the rear. They were finally rallied near the Korps Headquarters at Kelloselka by their divisional and regimental commanders.

The plan was changed to put the shaky elements of SS-IR 7 on the defense and attack with I./SS-IR 6 and III./SS-IR 7 on the 6th. Unfortunately most of III./SS-IR 7 got lost and never rendezvoused with I./SS-IR 6. The attack went on regardless until they encountered Soviet MG bunkers in a woodline. The Germans returned fire and sent patrols to locate the bunkers, which had gone silent. They couldn't be found and the battalion commander assumed that the bunkers had been neutralized by the SS fire earlier. This proved not to be the case when the battalion charged across the 200 meters of open ground to the woodline hiding the bunkers. They quickly opened up and decimated the battalion with enfilading fire. Any further advance was impossible and the battalion lay under the fire of the Soviet MGs before being ordered to withdraw six hours later!

Between 29 June and 8 July Nord lost 261 dead and missing and 307 wounded, but captured 254 prisoners. Its poor performance was the result of the lack of training and leadership that Brigf. Demelhuber complained about before it was committed to combat. Unfortunately for Nord, Himmler and Hitler weren't about to admit that the units of the Waffen-SS might need more training before they were ready to fight the sub-human Slavic hordes.

Unfortunately, they weren't able to receive much of it in safety, but rather had to learn proper tactics at the hands of the Soviets. Nord was placed under command of the Finnish Group J attacking the Soviet positions near Kestenga. The Finnish commander expressed his confidence in Nord's leadership by ignoring its divisional staff entirely and directly controlling Nord's regiments. By 20 August Nord had lost a total of 1085 men broken out in the table below:

However, due to replacements and reinforcements, the rest of the flak battalion having arrived around 15 July, Nord's strength had actually grown as shown below:

But weapons shortages still existed:

Most of the weaponry remained of Czech origin, but some progress had been made in re-equipping Nord with German weapons:

Commanders:
Brigf. Karl-Maria Demelhuber (17 June 41-20 April 42)

Strength:

30/6/41	306/1159/8048
21/7/41	325/1100/8000
20/8/41	359/1456/8293

Europa:

Recommendation:

Bibliography:

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