Operation
Tidal Wave: Ploesti August 1, 1943
v.1.0 June 3, 2001
Sources
There are
minor differences in details between various accounts. Any interested reader is
welcome to expand on this account. We particularly need squadron numbers for
the concerned bomb groups.
Ploesti
Ploesti is
to the US Air Force (successor to the US Army Air Corps) what Tarawa is to the
US Marine Corps. Because a third of Germany's oil came from the Rumanian fields
at Ploesti, it was the most heavily defended target in the German Reich, even
more than Berlin. The air attack hoped, but failed, to achieve surprise and the
result was bloody for the attackers.
They pushed
their attack with a blind determination and a complete disregard of their own
lives unprecedented in air warfare. The Marines at Tarawa fought like madmen
because they had no choice: stranded on the beach they either advanced or died
where they lay. At Ploesti, however, each and every aircrew had a choice of
proceeding or aborting, and the conditions were such that no one could have
blamed them for aborting - in most armies, soldiers are not expected to commit
suicide when the issue is not one of life and death.
Important
as Ploesti was, had this raid failed utterly, more would have been launched,
and again more till the job was done. The destruction of the refineries was
critical to ending the war, but the impact lay many months down the road. What
is difficult for a foreign student of World War II to understand is that the
aircrew at Ploesti persevered even though the nation as a whole had no great
passion against Germany. The war against Germany was, to most Americans, a
distasteful job to be done so they could turn their full attention to Japan,
the belligerent for whom Americans reserved their most visceral hatred. The
aircrew at Ploesti continued on their path because of those most abstract of
ideals: honor and a determination not to let down their comrades. We may
suspect that today's Americans might be as baffled as the foreign student at
the courage of the aircrews over Ploesti.
This first
major attack against the Rumanian airfields of Ploesti was conducted by 177
B-24s operating under IX Bomber Command from Benghazi, Libya, though three of
the groups were borrowed from the veteran 8th Air Force. One hundred
and fifty-four aircraft were targeted against seven installations; 23 spare
aircraft also took off, though 178 is the official number given. The planned
bomb-load consisted of 500-lb and 1000-lb bombs totaling 623,000 lbs., or 316
American tons. The exact tonnage carried and dropped cannot be known. The
round-trip flight was 2,400 miles.
Operation
Order 58, issued 48-hours before the take-off, set in motion this aerial task
force. It was under command of Brig.-General Uzal G. Ent, who issued the order. He flew with the lead group.
The air
Order of Battle was:
|
Target
Force
|
Commander |
Unit |
Aircraft |
|
1 (White
1) |
Col.
Compton |
376th
Bomb Group |
24 B-24 |
|
2 (White
2) |
Col.
Baker |
93rd
Bomb Group |
21 B-24 |
|
3 (White
3) |
Col.
Baker |
93rd
Bomb Group |
12 B-24 |
|
4 (White
4) |
Col.
Kane |
98th
Bomb Group |
40 B-24 |
|
5.
(White 5) |
Col.
Johnson |
44th
Bomb Group |
15 B-24 |
|
6 (Blue)
|
Lt. Col.
Posey |
44th
Bomb Group |
18 B-24 |
|
Red |
Col.
Woods |
389th
Bomb Group |
24 B-24 |
Because of
battle casualties and the incessant expansion of the US Army Air Forces, it is
well to remember that officers could jump three ranks in a year, and that the
majority of men in the task force would have consisted of teen-aged crew and
officers in their twenties. Twenty-five missions was the standard tour at this
time for the 8th Air Force, but the men of the 9th had to
fly 50, presumably because Mediterranean targets were easier to attack than
those in Germany.
The danger
arose from the need for lumbering bombers to fly straight and level for a
significant part of their run over target, making an attacker a sitting duck. Though
the B-24 carried ten 0.5 caliber machine-guns, a considerable defensive
fire-power, they could not maneuver or take evasive action, and even during
their run-in/run-out to target were limited in this respect. Further, the
Americans were at this time pushing a doctrine of low-level daylight attacks as
a way of increasing accuracy, something the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command
lacked because it worked at night. Once a bomber was locked into its run,
prayer was the only defensive measure available to the crew. On the first
Ploesti attack, the run in extended to 60 miles at low-level. To achieve
surprise, the B-24s, designed for high altitude attacks at 18,000-feet and
above, attacked at 200-feet, with some formations ending up at 30 to 50 feet.
The constructions at Ploesti rose much higher than that. We can only wonder at
the flying skill and physical strength required to keep this huge, 60,000-lb
gross load high altitude bomber to 200-feet.
The German
defenses at Ploesti were the densest in the world: over 200 88mm guns, hundreds
and perhaps thousands of smaller caliber weapons - these inflicted the major
damage - and perhaps 300 interceptors. In the event, surprise was not achieved,
and the Germans were waiting.
Of the 178
aircraft out, 163 made it over target. Of these 41 were lost in action, 8 in
Turkey, and 5 due to miscellaneous causes. Three hundred aircrew were killed,
140 captured, and of the crew returning, over 440 were wounded. The B-24
carried a 10-man crew, so casualties ran to 55%. Only one in six bombers were in flyable condition with the mission complete. The 30%
aircraft loss rate is appalling in terms of modern loss expectations, and was
so even for those desperate days.
Five
Medals of Honor were awarded for the first Ploesti raid, the most given by the
US Army Air Corps/Air Force for any single operation; two more were given for
subsequent raids. That makes seven of the 35 awarded through World War II, and
may be compared to the four each given in World War I and Korea, and the 13
given for Vietnam. The medals went to:
The high
percentage of senior officer awards came about because, unlike the case with
ground troops, senior officers flew bombing attacks with their units, usually
leading. This was equivalent to a battalion or brigade commander acting as
point for his attacking troops.
Readers
might be inclined to assume that because five awards were made, some politics
must have been behind the awards. In reality, however, the first Ploesti raid
just happens to be one of those rare military actions where extraordinary
bravery was displayed by large numbers of combatants.
2nd
Lt. Lloyd H. Hughes, for example, won his award in this manner: His aircraft was
hit before arriving over target, and was streaming fuel from a wing in so heavy
a stream that the waist gunner could not see. Despite this, he continued on his
course. He flew his aircraft through leaping flames from the ground - remember, the B-24s were attacking at 200 feet and even below. As
surely the crew must have realized would happen, this set the aircraft on fire,
and he went down to a certain death.
Two of the
colonels inadvertently went wide of their targets, and then returned to lead their
bomb groups into a fully-alerted defense. They were unable to see much as they
flew through billowing smoke and flames, unable to save themselves should they
approach a chimney or wire, and unable to save themselves should a dying bomber
crash through their formations. They faced yet another hazard, an extraordinary
one: the previous groups had dropped time-delayed bombs with their regular
incendiary loads, and the late attackers had no way of knowing when they might be blown apart by one of those bombs.
These
awards were dearly won and richly deserved.
Though 40%
damage was reported, because of the lack of a follow-up, the Germans quickly
repaired their installations, and before the war was done, Ploesti was to claim
over 2900 crew as killed and missing. It is said a thousand men downed over
Ploesti were liberated from POW camps at the end of the war. By contrast, today
we can count on our fingers the number of world air forces that have a thousand
combat pilots in total. In the spring and summer of 1944, US Fifteenth Air
Force hammered Ploesti. A raid on June 23, 1944, sent 761 bombers against Rumanian
oil targets. 60,000 airmen eventually flew against Ploesti, dropping 13,000
tons of bombs, eventually knocking out the oil fields and accelerating
Germany's defeat.
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2003 Ravi Rikhye. Reproduction in any form prohibited without express
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