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Iran Air Force vs US airpower
Volume 7, Number 3 July 29, 2008 A 1985 Study By The BDM Corporation Forwarded by Mandeep Singh Bajwa Note: for every mention of "soviet Union" in the
paper, replace with "United States": you will then be reading a paper updated
for 2008. Plan To Change the Map
of India-Pakistan & Afghanistan Region (or Dismemberment of Pakistan (1985) –
proposed by BDM Corporation (Subsidiary of FORD), Intelligence Analysts), under
the New World Order. SCENARIO OF THE FUTURE A Soviet military
presence in Afghanistan – thus positioned on the Pakistan border – would not be
so disturbing if South Asia did not have a history of violent settlement of
conflicts. The inherent belligerency between India and Pakistan has produced
three wars in less than 40 years. The details of the disputes evolved from
religious and territorial issues which have neither disappeared nor been
diminished by an arms competition that has acquired a raison d’etre all
its own. India’s rise to the
status of a regional superpower, a posture which now rivals that of its
occupier, Britain, has consistently been at the expense of Pakistan. The In the
initial confrontation between 1947-48, Pakistan did well to hold the high ground
while the prize – the value of Kashmir –went to India. The 1965 war was as
indecisive as it was costly to both. Despite lackluster showing by the Indian
Army, what kudos the Pakistan earned in terms of that performance were lost in
the rematch six years later when the Bangladesh revolt and Indian invasion
resulted in a humiliating defeat in the West and the loss of East Pakistan. India’s test
of a “peaceful” nuclear device in 1974 did not soothe the regional rivalry. Its
symbolic value for Indian prestige stimulated a crash program by Pakistan which
in turn has caused New Delhi to take on a crusade against nuclear proliferation.
Rather than become involved as a signatory to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty,
India has taken on the self-anointed role of regional enforcer. In the fall of
1984, there was growing evidence that the Indian military had developed
preemptive options and was urging an attack on Pakistan’s developing nuclear
facilities. In an address to an army commanders’ conference only weeks before
her assassination, the late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi complained that
“Pakistan’s nuclear program has brought about a qualitative change in our
security environment.” Subsequent reports, both on the accelerated pace of
Pakistan’s nuclear development and on heightened efforts to increase its
survivability by constructing underground facilities probably means that an
Indian preemptive option may not be infinitely applicable. In any case, the
number, location, and protection of those facilities probably means that an
Indian attack could neither be as small nor surgical as the precedent of the
Israeli strike against the lone Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.
But there is no shortage of
excuses for war (like U.S. has demonstrated).. Earlier in 1984 the Indians were
blaming Pakistan for fomenting revolt among the Sikhs--charges noticeably absent
since Indira Gandhi’s death. Between July and October there occurred an
escalating series of border clashes with Indian patrols penetrating 60-km across
the uninhibited but disputed territory of the Siachin Glacier, high up the
Himalayan Rim. Interestingly, it was during this same period that the
cross-border raids by Kabul ground units reached their peak in frequency and
magnitude.
There has never been a
paucity of conflict scenarios between India and Pakistan, but with Soviet
offensive power ensconced in the Afghan regional pivot, new and more dangerous
possibilities arise. Such scenarios are new in that they could involve a joint
or at least a coordinated Indo-Soviet effort. They are more dangerous in the
sense that combined Indo-Soviet capabilities permit them to contemplate
aggressive military actions with not only a higher pay-off than either could
achieve alone, but also with substantially-reduced risk.
The Soviets and Indians
manifest a growing interest in the violation of Pakistani air-space, which is
shared consequence of engaging quite different targets. For the Soviets, the
concentrated insurgent base camps just across the border (where air-strikes
could have a more significant effect than on dispersed and hard-t-acquire
targets in Afghanistan) must look increasingly attractive as they become
frustrated with their inability to close down the infiltration routes from the
resistance sanctuaries into Afghanistan. Whatever the immediate military valu,
the collateral effect of terror upon the civilian refugees would likely push
these settlements further and further from the border—thus decreasing the
proximity of te mujahideen to a key source of their support. Given the
high percentage of rebel arms which are of Chinese origin, the Soviets may also
feel compelled to interdict the most conspicuous route of supply – the Karakoram
Highway linking China and Pakistan.
Attack from the air is a
necessity for any attempt to take out Pakistan’s budding nuclear program. The
problem for either India or Soviets in this regard is the active resistance of
Pakistan’s air force. But in this scenario, the two countries have an incentive
to act in concert. A carefully coordinated air offensive attacking
simultaneously from two different directions would overwhelm Pakistan’s
interceptors. With fighter strikes limiting the defenders sortie rate, the
bombers of Soviet strategic aviation could inflict punishing blows against
Pakistani AIRBASES. After this initial surge provided meaningful
air-superiority, Indian and Soviet forces would have an uninterrupted ride for
subsequent attacks and could concentrate against their respective targets. In
such a campaign, India, and the USSR could achieve via joint action that which
neither could accomplish individually (at least with high confidence of success
and acceptable loss).
THE INDO-SOVIET VICE
A far more ambitious and
permanent solution to the joint irritant of Pakistan would be a combined
Indo-Soviet invasion.. In its relatively brief history, West Pakistan has never
been realistically threatened by abject dismemberment—until the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. It is not evident that either the Soviet Union or India desires
the disappearance of Pakistan. However, their past behavior (Soviet support for
the Baluch uprising of the early 1970’s and the Indian invasion of Bangladesh)
certainly does not rule this out as a possible, if unlikely, contingency. In the
wake of a devastating air offensive, a simultaneous Indo-Soviet ground assault
from opposite directions with converging axes would be unstoppable. An Indian
attack out of the Punjab toward Islamabad (a’ la 1965) coupled with a Soviet
drive out of the Khyber (utilizing absolute firepower superiority to suppress
the opposing infantry; air assault to enfilade defense strong points and seize
key terrain; and attack helicopters to retard reinforcement and maneuver) would
force the main body of the Pakistan army to fight back-to-back. Options facing
the Pakistanis would be unacceptable—defend in place under the prospect of
ever-tightening encirclement , or withdraw south and abandon the capital and
Kashmir. A second Indian offensive—a deep armored sweep across the Sind desert
(a’ la 1971) that linked up on the Hinus River north of Karachi with a mirrored
Soviet move through the lightly-defended Baluchi crest—would seal Pakistan’s
fate.
Against India alone. Given
current force deployment, the Pakistanis have a reasonable prospect of making a
good account of themselves (accepting some territorial loss for a lot of Indian
blood in a protracted series of attrition battles).. The same is also true
concerning the Soviets, given the terrain on the Afghan frontier and assuming
substantial Pakistani redeployment prior to take on both simultaneously, with
quantitative and qualitative inferiority on the ground and without adequate air
protection, invites defeat within weeks if not days.
REAPING THE BENEFITS!
For the aggressors, the
outcome would offer enormous strategic benefit. Using the Indus River as the
primary partition of responsibility. Kabul could re-establish its historic claim
to the northwest frontier and be confident that, however long its internal
insurgency lasted, the “miscreants” possessed neither sanctuary nor source of
supply. The Soviets could bring the “fruits of class struggle:” to a newly
established People’s Republic of Baluchistan which would, of course, ask for
protection in exchange for Soviet port access on the Indian Ocean (Gawadar).
India could complete its quest for the Kashmir and administer as an autonomous
region whatever was left.
Other than short-lived
economic sanctions and even briefer condemnation by irrelevant international
bodies, the risk of outside interference to such a short, decisive campaign
would come from only two significant antagonists – China and the U.S.
For China, her proximity to
this potential battle zone does not translate into deployable power. Between
Pakistan and the adjacent province of Sinkiang lies an enormous mountain range.
With only a few infantry division in this province and an antique air force what
China cannot provide prior to hostilities will not come. With the mountain
passes closed by weather, the only militarily significant land route linking
China and Pakistan is the Karakoram Highway. An 800-km road which took 20 years
to build , its 99 bridges and 1,708 culverts make it one of the world’s most
attractive targets for air interdiction.
For the US, strategic
timing, not tactical geography, is the most critical limitation. With advanced
warning, the US Air Force could redeploy enough US assets to correct the aerial
imbalance, redress some point defense deficiencies, and establish a symbolic
ground presence. But realistically, the warning time prior to hostilities is
likely to be too short and the assets the US can deploy after the shooting
starts is not whether the Soviets and Indians would actually initiate such a
campaign, nor how they would operationally implement it—but that it is a
consequence of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan that this
scenario is even available for conjecture. It is a contingency which did not
exist five years ago.
The most likely scenario,
however, is that the Soviets—by carefully orchestrating their military posture
next door, tightening the political –strategic vice of the Indo-Soviet bloc, and
periodically allowing the counterinsurgency war to spill over the border—will
convey to the Pakistanis a heightened sense of the danger they are in. Given an
overdose of threat perception, Pakistan might find it convenient to do the
Soviets’ dirty work for them by closing down the frontier passes, keeping the
refugees from creating a unified and effective infrastructure, and inhibiting
the external flow of arms to the rebels.
Afghan armed resistance may
go on for decades. That notwithstanding, if the Soviets can militarily or
politically seal off sanctuaries in Pakistan, the intensity and effectiveness
of the guerilla activity will fall to a level, the Soviet “pacification by
terror” campaign can achieve its intended results over time.
THE AMERICAN OPTION
The motile challenges to US
regional policy aggravated by Soviet action in Afghanistan offer contradictory
dilemmas. Should the US provide the arms modernization necessary to backstop
Pakistan’s self confidence in the face of growing blackmail while discouraging
its proliferative ego trip for an Islamic bomb”? Should the US prepare
contingency forces for a credible regional commitment without forward
deployment; attempt to wean the Indians from the lure of Soviet largesse while
resisting their hegemonic ambitions to “paper train” the Russians while their
troops make a mess in Afghanistan?
But the most pressing policy
issue is what the United States will do to help the Afghan people. David Isby,
one of the most informed commentators on the Soviet War in Afghanistan describes
the expectation of a mujahid after listening to President Reagan state
his support for the jihad over Voice of America.
Being an educated man, and
knowing what the Americans had done to aid people
fighting communism in
the past, he went outside to look upward for the black C-130s he thought would
be arriving with what the Afghans needed to keep fighting. The black C-130s
never arrived. The US faces
not only a policy decision but moral choice. To proclaim a “crusade for freedom”
and then offer nothing but rhetoric is not just hypocritical—it is contemptuous
of every American value. It is time to put up or shut up. And there is no
clearer litmus test than supporting the Afghan resistance with the one armament
that every observer of the war has noted they need most—a man-portable
surface-to-air missile. When the Soviet Union feels free to arm Marxists and
terrorists all over the globe with its latest weaponry, and when the US has a
massive stock of surplus Redeye missiles (which are being replaced with the new
Stinger), why does the US continue the charade of dribbling third-party SA-7s to
the Afghan Resistance? America can
make the Soviet invasion extremely costly by aiming directly at the military
assets, which most typifies the war—Soviet air power. An unwillingness to
provide that minimal assistance will foreordain the success of the Soviet “time
and terror” strategy. America’s future deterrent to Soviet aggression in the
third world will be no more credible than in December 1979, and Afghanistan will
not be a prologue but a precedent. This article on page 103
shows two maps of Pakistan under the caption of “A Scenario of the Future?”
Top Map - Pakistan
graphically depicting “Joint
Indo-Soviet Air Offensive” · Preemptive attacks on
Pakistan’s major airbases · Soviet bombing of
refugee camps and air assault seizure of key passes. · Indian Strikes on
Pakistani nuclear facilities · Soviet interdiction of
Karakoram Highway Bottom Map - Pakistan
graphically
depicting “Ground
Campaign for the Dismemberment of Pakistan” · Creation of independent
“Peoples Republic of Baluchistan” with USSR Naval Base and Force Deployment
Treaty · Absorption of northwest
tribal territories into Afghanistan · Absorption of West
Kashmir into India · Administration of Sind
/Punjab autonomous zone by India. References: NOTE: 2.
Just imagine who is occupying Afghanistan right now, and these thought came from
two American Defense/Intelligence Analysts, working for BDM Corporation (a
subsidiary of FORD) of MacLean, VA. Only juxtapose Soviets with the word
American to relate what is going on in Afghanistan at presents and the direction
of the blowing winds engulfing Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Iran. All these
countries are surrounded by Military bases now possessed in a
region called “Petrolistan.” Complete details are posted in a 30-page PDF File
posted at
www.environmentaldirectory.
According to University of California Professor, and president of Japan Policy
Research Institute, (author of BLOWBACK and The Sorrows of Empire), U.S. now
possesses more than 750 Bases around the globe to enforce the New World Order,
as we have seen after September 11, 2001. 3.
This quest would be incomplete without connecting the above information with a
Known World Oil Reserves Map published by British Petroleum (BP) that is posted
on the web at to learn where McCain acquired the “110 –year” military occupation
of Iraq:
http://earthtrends.wri.org/
4.
“The United
States and the Global Struggle for Minerals,” by Alfred E/ Eckes, Jr.,
University of Texas Press, Austin & Toronto, 1979. ISBN Box 0-292-78511-9. (pbk)
5.
“RESOURCE
WARS- The New Landscape of Global Conflict,” by Michael T. Klare, Owl Books
Henry Holt and Company, 2001. ISBN 08050-5576-2. (pbk)
6.
“OIL, POWER &
EMPIRE: Iraq and the U.S. Global Agenda,” by Larry Everest, Common Courage Pres,
Monroe, Maine 2004. ISBN 1-56751-246-1.(pbk)
7.
“CONFESSIONS
OF AN ECONOMIC HIT MAN,” by John Perkins, A Plume Book, published by Penguin
Group, New York 2004. ISBN 0-452-28708-1. (pbk)
8.
“Forbidden
TRUTH: U.S. - Taliban Secret Oil Diplomacy and the Failed Hunt for Bin Laden, “
by Jean-Charles Brisard & Guillaume Dasquie, and published by Thunder’s Mouth
Press/Nation Books, New York 2002. ISBN 1-56025-414-9. (pbk).
9.
“The
PENTAGON’S NEW MAP – War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century,” by Thomas P.M.
Bennett, Berkeley Books, New York 2004. ISBN 0-425-20239-9. (pbk).
10.
“The ISLAMIC
BOMB: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, “ by Steve Weissman &
Herbert Krosney, NYT/Times Books, New York 1981. ISBN 0-8129-0978-X
11.
“ROGUE STATE:
A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower, by William Blum, published by Common
Courage Press, Monroe, Maine 2005. ISBN 1-565751-374-3.
12.
"After Iraq: A
report from the new Middle East - and a glimpse of its possible future," by
Jeffrey Goldberg, pp cover and 68-79. published in "The ATLANTIC Magazine,
January/February 2008. Cover had the map of New Middle East as envisaged by the
Neocons and Zionocons.
. Volume 7 Number 2 March 19, 2008 Hamid Hussain Comments on Major A.H. Amin's analysis
of US policy Pakistan/Afghanistan
March 19, 2008
Editor's Introduction To Major Amin's
Analysis
An analytic piece by a former Pakistani
armored corps officer who is well versed with military history. He has insight
into Pakistan army mindset and has been in Afghanistan for the last few years.
He is one of few officers well versed with military history especially of the
region. In addition, he has first hand knowledge of ground realities in
Afghanistan being there for more than four years.
Hamid
Hussain's comments
I have had interaction with
large number of Pakistani officers of all ranks from Lieutenant to Lieutenant
General and frankly this officer is one of few with such insight into the
region’s military history. He does not mince his words and has a unique
perspective with which many may disagree. My comments are in italics and blue.
These are exchanges between two eccentrics who have interest in military history
and based on hypothetical scenarios. He can be counted as an expert but I’m
surely a spectator. Most official and non-official reports and briefings tend
to be polite and do not touch ‘inflammable’ topics pertaining to the conflict
but for a meaningful and informed discussion, no aspect should be a taboo. My
comments are based on my recent three week trip to the region and interaction
with people of different backgrounds with main focus on Pushtuns.
Readers should be mindful that this is a
very limited perspective and based on armchair spectators like me who have the
luxury to pass judgments sitting in the comfort of their homes. Not even hot air
of the conflicts touched them or their loved ones. Those who live through the
horrors of violence will surely have a very different take on these issues. )
Hamid
Need for a New Long Term US
Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
(It should be clear at outset that several competing
interests are involved in terms of U.S. policy in Afghanistan. A number of
government agencies with different approach and perspective are engaged in
various activities in Afghanistan and this makes the coordination task a
nightmare. Expanding role of NATO has further complicated the task. Now there
are severe limitations on U.S. maneuvers due to heavy commitment in Iraq.
Former Secretary of State had duly warned before the Iraq war that’ this thing
will suck oxygen from everything else’ and he was right. On part of Afghans, it
will be naïve to expect that U.S. & NATO will continue the heavy lifting
indefinitely while they will have the luxury where some Afghans making money
from the foreign funding and reconstruction while another group of Afghans
making money by blowing up this infrastructure. The solution will be dictated
by Afghans and at the end of the day they have to decide among themselves
whether they will slaughter each other or decide to live with each other. As far
as the foreign factor is concerned, Afghans will need to make their mind about
choosing sides. They have to pick one side whether to ally with U.S. or with
Taliban. They can not be just spectators and expect that their country will
simply drift forward and foreigners will have unlimited money and patience.
Having said that, it is an undeniable fact that Afghanistan is much better in
the last seven years. Good news is usually not news but common Afghan has
benefited from the changed situation. Off course, more is needed but looking at
all standards realistically Afghanistan is better. Even if one looks at
violence and compares it with Pakistan things are not that bad. Again, more
effort is needed to avoid loss of innocent lives. Those who oppose U.S. presence
in Afghanistan have this simplistic notion that if tomorrow U.S. leaves
Afghanistan, everything will be fine. Strategically, for U.S. the main question
is whether heavy military presence will serve their security interests or more
covert and less visible presence will be more cost effective. U.S. policy in
Afghanistan for the next decade will revolve around this question and benefits
and risks equation will depend on which path is taken.) The USA
occupied Afghanistan in November 2001 and its almost more than 6 years since
then and yet the United States has failed to win the hearts and minds of a
substantial part of Afghan populace. The reason lies in abject failure of USA's
economic policy .This in turn has led to a counterproductive situation.
There is
nothing inevitable in history but those who cannot identify the critical time
span in any crisis and who fail to seize it by the horns are bound to fail. Such
unfortunately has been the case with US strategy in Afghanistan. The US
president failed to find the right strategic talent for Afghanistan and thus
thrust mediocre US policy makers on Afghanistan who know, nor recognize anything
higher than their shallow mediocrity! The main
thrust of USA's policy was to construct roads and schools and clinics. These
were important but no substantial class of stakeholders which had a vested
interest in success of US policy inside Afghanistan was created. No major
employment opportunities were created. No major effort was made to encourage
private enterprise. No major attempt was made to privatize Afghanistan's main
economic potential i.e. its massive custom revenues most of which do not land in
government coffers and are skimmed away by corrupt custom officials as bribes
and by smugglers as profits once Afghan imports are re-exported i.e. smuggled to
Pakistan. US
approach in short was bureaucratic, conservative and in final summing up timid!
(When confronted by a problem, we usually throw in
more bodies and money and hope that the problem will go away. In fact this
creates another bureaucratic layer further slowing down the process. British
approach was for long haul. General Abraham Roberts spent 50 years in India
while his son Fredrick Roberts 44 years which means that between father and son,
ninety four years. We are sending young kids on three to six months stints.
Almost none of them speak either Dari or Pushtu. Result is that we are being
fleeced by every one. On top of it corrupt U.S. officials are treating these
funds in a manner which reminds me of old west ways. It looks like a wagon
loaded with cash has broken down on the main road and every body is taking money
as he pleases with no sheriff in sight. First we went to bed with warlords to
find out later that it was not good. Then we shook hand with drug lords to find
four years later that we were successful in making Afghanistan a leading
exporter of opium and bringing it on top of chart. Now we are trying to arm
tribesmen. And then surprise, we found that it was the same guy who was wearing
different hats depending on the situation. I don’t see any coherent game plan.
We are just adjusting to changing tactical ground realities. Unfortunately, we
do not have desserts on the menu. Our choices are limited to which brand of
castor oil we want to take. To be fair, the work itself is a messy one with no
perfect solution.) Bearing
Point a large US firm got the major contract for economic reform. It hired
Americans and expatriates who would not have got any decent job in USA or even a
medium level country. In addition they hired some Afghan Americans who came to
Afghanistan for a short term period, to make a quick buck and go back to their
relatively far more comfortable permanent places on the California coast.
(There is no perfect solution to
any given problem. A certain amount of wastage/corruption is expected, however
most important thing to focus on is to make sure that this wastage does not
derail the whole project where everyone walks away with whatever he can get hold
of leaving only ruin behind. A number of Afghan-Americans who were owners of
pizza places and some used car salesmen ended up running mega projects in
Afghanistan. No wonder we are now scratching our heads what went wrong. Almost
all Americans who deal with them are polite as they have to work with them and
don’t want to offend them. In reality, they are disgusted by the petty fights
about personal gains among a whole lot of Afghans. None other than President
Bush remarked that ‘you can not buy an Afghan but you can surely rent a one’ and
make no mistake we are renting a whole lot by dozens. It took central state
hundred years to create a sense of nationhood among Afghans. Thirty years of
civil war shattered the very foundation and it will be hard work to rebuild it
again. Realism and not romanticism will save Afghanistan. Afghans will need a
lot of soul searching.) The magnum
bonus achievement of US advisors was creation of AISA a government agency funded
and administered by USA and some European donors to regulate licensing and
setting up of industrial parks. Again since little private enterprise was
involved with Bearing Point is in the background and making a good buck hiring
Afghans with US or Canadian passports at relatively low salaries and some local
Afghans. The main industrial project of AISA industrial parks in Jalalabad,
Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar took six years to be awarded and will take
another one year to complete. Having said that it is good if AISA has
licensing/registration alone and Industrial Parks are handled by a highly
professional international company with full support of the US Government and
with zero percent interference from the Afghan Government. A better
approach could have been to award the contract to a private firm on turnkey
basis with a profit incentive instead of hiring Afghans on fixed salary in
AISA.This combined with a 30 or 50 year incentive to industries to export quota
free to USA , combined with a buy back guarantee with USA with the condition
that all quality standards were met would have let to creation of industrial
parks in Afghanistan by mid 2004 and by mid 2005 or late 2005 many hundreds of
industrial units would have been functioning in Afghanistan. Thus at least
permanent long term employment could have been created for 200,000 to 500,000
Afghans. Instead the main thrust of US economic policy was on roads ,schools and
clinics which benefited a coupe of construction companies of foreign companies
and created a low income short term employment for an Afghan labour which could
not have exceeded 300,000 at any time. Schools and clinics awarded to LBGI were
in turn sub contracted by LBGI to Afghan contractors , many being US and
European passport holders at about 25 % to 30 % of the total cost. These
contractors in turn sub contracted these to local Afghan petty contractors at
low rates.Thus hardly 10 % of the total amount earmarked for these schools and
clinics were actually spent resulting in leaking and collapsing roofs and highly
sub standard construction. This faux pas was well covered by the Washington Post
in late 2005. It has
been estimated that the contraband non drug mafia in Afghanistan is larger than
the drug mafia of Afghanistan. In turn both the mafias have overlapping key
figures involved in both the trades. It has been estimated that some 80 % of
Afghanistan's imports are smuggled back to neighboring Pakistan where custom
duties are very high. The United States made a somewhat lukewarm effort to
re-structure the low paid and highly corrupt and inefficient Afghan customs
.Another approach could have been to award the custom collection and enforcement
task to an international private firm like Cotecna or SGS. This way Afghan
custom revenues could have been multiplied by 400 % to 600 % and Afghan
Government could have been made financially far stronger, while also reducing
its overwhelming dependence on foreign aid. It is significant to note that many
key Afghan governors on the bordering provinces as well as some ministers are
known to have a close link with the non drug contraband mafia.
(Those who have even only rudimentary knowledge of
the country well know that they and their forefathers have been involved in this
business. It is important to note that it is not considered illegal, unethical
or immoral. They consider it as a legitimate business and fight every effort by
nation states to regulate this activity.)) During the
past six years many Afghans and many Pashtuns saw daisy cutters, Chinooks and
armored cars but no one saw the benefits of USA's advent in Afghanistan. Both
the countries got a lot of hot lead and shrapnel but no Marshall Plan other than
a Marshal being created in Afghanistan!
(Each theatre is different and no two Marshal plans
can be same. Most important factor is the social and psychological make up of
the population. In the aftermath of Second World War, two nations; Japan and
Germany took a different path. At individual level, even loss of a single
innocent human life is a tragedy and every effort should be made to preserve
human life. However, in the life of nations internal and external factors can
catapult them into the midst of a horrible storm. Japanese and Germans are
first rate fighters and they plunged the world into a horrible carnage. Both
nations came out of the conflict devastated and defeated. However, both nations
made a difficult choice at a critical juncture of their history. They used the
resources of their conquerors judiciously and in fifty years came out as front
runners among the league of nations. Even Vietnamese after a brutal war came out
with their nation intact. In contrast, look at Palestinians and Afghans.
Palestinians unable to solve their own problem tried to hop on a different
train. They dragged every neighboring Arab country into direct conflict and
thus were able to directly contribute to crushing defeats to Egypt, Syria and
Jordan. They produced gentlemen such as late Abdullah Azam who had nothing for
his own people but was very successful in brutalizing societies such as Egypt,
Afghanistan and Pakistan with his extremist ideologies. Afghans ended up
burning up their own house for good in the struggle to get rid of the Russians.
Pakistan is now an assembly plant of suicide bombers.)
In Afghanistan this was a case of lack of
vision on part of US Government. In Pakistan which got more than 10 Billion USD
in aid, the corrupt non Pashtun dominated government spent a very nominal part
of this aid on the Pashtun areas despite the fact that this aid was meant to
basically pacify the Pashtun areas of Pakistan which are definitely the centre
of gravity of Al Qaeda/Taliban.No special export zone with the right to quota
free guaranteed export reinforced by buy back guarantees was created in the NWFP
and Balochistan provinces of Pakistan. These zones could have gone a long way in
creating employment and prosperity in the Pashtun areas and vastly reduce the
sense of alienation in the Pashtuns.The reasons for this were more ethnic than
anything and the USA made no effort to arm twist the tin pot Musharraf regime
into spending this money on the Pashtun areas of Pakistan. The only investment
that Pakistan's non Pashtun dominated government made on the Pashtun areas was
in form of Cobra helicopter munitions, 7.62 mm bullets, 155 mm artillery etc in
pounding the Pashtun areas indiscriminately, targeting mostly non combatant’s
women and children.
(There is a common perception which has never been
seriously debated which takes the view that if Washington simply pumps more
money into the region then the problem will go away. As a spectator of Afghan
civil war, I came to the conclusion and I may be totally wrong that when there
are more spoils the game becomes more brutal and uglier. Every Afghan faction
and sub-faction took money from everyone and his cousin and turned their
homeland into rubble. Without understanding the sociology of the population in
the conflict zone, one may deduce wrong conclusions. One example may give some
insight. In early 1990s, towns started to fall to Afghan rebels fighting
against Soviet backed government. Afghan rebels conquered a town in Khost and
all spoils were declared booty and distributed among various factions. They had
gathered in a school and there was quandary about how to distribute the
furniture of the school among the men. They decided to chop all the furniture
and distribute the wood to be used for fire. It looks like time has frozen in
some areas. They routinely executed school teachers labeling them as
communists. A new generation of leaders with a different mindset emerged when
every sensible Afghan was either killed or forced to leave the country. The
jungle was left for the wolves only. You are more familiar with luxurious
dwellings of these new leaders in one of the most expensive real estate enclaves
in Kabul. In my humble view the situation is tribal territories along
Pakistan-Afghan border is more complex with a number of players with different
agendas. I fear that rather than learning the lesson from Afghanistan, the
region is following the Afghan example.) In
addition no major effort was made to create a stock exchange or float investment
bonds giving good interest which could have created a substantial class in
Afghanistan whose success and prosperity was linked to US policies in
Afghanistan. It was just a matter of a little imagination and printing bonds
with the backing and sovereign guarantee of US government for payment of
interest in USD for a period of 10 to 20 years. Unfortunately there was no
brilliant man like Nixon in the US leadership who could think of a coup like
delinking of gold standard in the early 70s.A condition could have been imposed
that in order to buy these Afghanistan Fund Bons all companies had to register
in Afghanistan thus bringing money to Afghanistan as well as a long term class
of stake holders in Afghanistan.
(This is a good idea which could have benefited the
country in the long run.) I
developed friendship with a US official in Kabul in 2005.We discussed many
aspects of US policy in Afghanistan.In the end the US officer pessimistically
concluded that his superiors were a bunch of w_t p______s .Similar ideas were
expressed by many US military officers I met in Afghanistan in the course of
military contracting in course of 4 years.
(You just got the small sample of the feeling of
frustration. Patience has never been an American virtue. I don’t think that we
will pack from Afghanistan tomorrow or after small setbacks. We will be engaged
but the methodology may change depending on the public support and economic
situation of U.S. I see future with more covert operations rather than heavy
military presence. We may decide about this inevitable outcome in a wise way
before more damage is done or we will learn the usual way after burning a number
of fingers and toes: both ours and of others. The battle will be fought by
Afghans themselves with or without our help. I don’t know whether it will be
good or bad but I think that if violence crosses a certain threshold in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, then there is a possibility of division of Afghanistan
along Hindu Kush line. I don’t think non-Pushtuns are in a mood for Pushtun
hegemony anymore. This probably will not be in the form of separation or
emergence of new countries but it will be de facto just we are seeing in Iraq.
Each community entrenched in its own ethnic enclave with protracted fight along
contested areas. If that event comes first then in addition to increasing intra-Pushtun
violence there will be increase pressure on the state of Pakistan. If the
current cycle of violence emanating from tribal areas continue to kill and maim
people in big non-Pushtun cities such as Rawalpindi, Lahore, Karachi then it
will be naïve not to expect a backlash against Pushtuns in general. This will
estrange different ethnic communities. Only a concerted effort by concerned
citizens can prevent the schism. The problem is that even informed people do not
analyze these trends rationally. They are easily carried away by emotions and
dwell on conspiracy theories preventing a concerted effort to prevent
fragmentation. They keep looking for the hidden hands and not paying attention
to their actions and evident social, economic and political factors which push
events in a particular direction.) It may be
added that the same policy should have been followed in Pakistan , particularly
its tribal areas creating industrial zones guaranteeing 10 to 20 years quota
free exports to USA with buy back guarantee instead of doling out many billion
US Dollars to Pakistanis highly corrupt military junta. This way employment
would have been created and potential recruits of Al Qaeda and Taliban given
decent risk free long term jobs in the industrial units established as part of
this policy.
(It may work but then who could guarantee that the
same Wazir or Mahsud who would make $500 per month from working in an industry
in tribal areas will also not sell his tomatoes at $50 per kilogram to al-Qaeda
up in the mountains to make some extra change. Money is only one factor and
other aspects need to be tackled along with economic activity. I think it is
naïve to expect that the young chap who has life and death authority when he is
member of one of the extremist outfits will go back and run a tea stall on the
roadside suffering daily humiliation. These are social factors which need to be
studied. I fear more kids will follow this model and it will be of different
shapes in different parts of the country. In Karachi Muhajir youth have joined
the fascist strain of MQM and living comfortably on the extortion from the urban
areas. Rural Sindhis are following the same path. Their preference is
kidnapping for ransom. They are now quietly moving to urban areas after
learning lessons from MQM. In Darra Adam Khel, flashy SUVs come and distribute
monthly stipend to the Taliban foot soldiers openly. This kid getting a regular
salary, brandishing a brand new AK-47, instilling some fear through his coercive
capability and also gaining some respect being the enforcer of some good is now
on a different plane. He has crashed into the party and it will not be an easy
task to reverse this trend. The phenomenon needs serious research.) No major
effort was made to regulate the visa regime. A Work Permit was issued by the
Ministry of Labour for visa extension but this permit was not honored by the
Ministry of Interior when AISA issued them visa extension letters for multiple
visas in many cases thus restricting in country and out country movement of
expatriates. The Afghan Embassies particularly those in Pakistan followed yet
another highly absurd practice of granting a 15 day single entry visa to all
applicants with the condition that after they had visited Afghanistan once and
exited they could not apply for another Afghan visa till the three month period
of the visa expired. Thus an expatriate with a valid Afghan Work Permit was told
that work permit had no legal value in eyes of Afghan Embassy Staff and that
they could not apply for another visa till the three months visa validity period
expired.
Afghanistan and even Pakistan may be compared to a sort of West Germany and
South Korea for USA.Any withdrawal from Afghanistan would straight away lead to
re-occupation of the country by Taliban with an active re-entry of Russia, Iran
and India on side of non Taliban forces. The Afghan Army needs at least 10 to 15
years to recover its military effectiveness. Thus all this would be a 100
percent disaster for USA.
(Same argument was forwarded in case of Vietnam. The
two situations are not the same but I think strategically it will be more cost
effective and may be more productive if U.S. concentrate on covert measures to
tackle the extremist issue rather than embarking on the projects of huge
military footprints and nation building. Plenty of local players are more than
willing to rent their guns at a much lower price tag. This is strictly looking
at the menace of extremists. On bigger canvas, helping these countries build
their own societies will make the world a better place for our children. I
would prefer my children going as exchange students or scholars to Afghanistan
or Pakistan and vice versa. This is much better than sending our kids with
M-16s and in return expecting their kids blowing themselves up. )
The only
viable strategy for USA in Afghanistan is to settle in for next two decades.
Introduce a Marshall Plan which creates employment and prosperity .Introduce
public bonds with good interest that make US presence in Afghanistan a cause of
progress and prosperity for many. Keep a watchful eye on the region. Build up
the capacity of the Afghan National Army and Police. Any withdrawal by USA would
be a cardinal strategic blunder. Something which the USA cannot afford and an
event which would constitute a Clausewitzian culminating point of USA.
(Afghanistan and Pakistan will be saved only by
Afghans and Pakistanis. Even if U.S. comes in with good intentions it can
surely help in some aspects but it is unlikely to change the dynamic of
economics, governance and conflict. Both countries are nations in terms of
definitions but a long process over the last sixty years has widened the fault
lines. Present geographic boundaries of Afghanistan have not changed much in
the last three hundred years. Efforts in 20th century mainly
coercive helped to strengthen the central state but ethnic, tribal and political
Islamic forces have significantly weakened the foundation. A Herculean effort by
wise Afghan leadership with a grand bargain among various groups will be needed
to even to go back to the status quo of the last century. Pakistan is a new
state which has struggled to cobble a nation. It embarked on using the
religion as an anchor but it didn’t work. On one end, it opened Pandora boxes
by declaring some citizens as non-Muslim i.e. Ahmadis and on the other end
sectarian fault line widened. Bengalis were as good or as bad Muslims as any
other Pakistani but they finally rejected the Pakistani identity and were able
to achieve independence. The ethnic fault lines have widened in the last
twenty years and I don’t see any mechanism in place either at government or at
civil society level to address this crucial issue. Baluchs are completely
alienated to a point where Baluchistan university is now a no go area for armed
forces personnel of the country’s army. This was frankly admitted none other
than the Commandant of the Staff College at Quetta. Ethnic and sectarian forces
will realign and if violence stays above a certain threshold then international
players will have no choice but to work with local players rather than routing
everything through Islamabad. That will be a bad day for Pakistan. )
Further
the USA has to reinforce the democratic forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan while
making use of Pakistan's mercenary army which is still far cheaper than any
Western force even if their pay is tripled by US aid. At the same time the
Pakistani forces being more than 60 % non Pashtuns have to be restrained from
causing collateral damage.
(I sincerely hope and pray that I’m wrong but the
seeds of chaos sowed two decades ago are bearing fruit now. Off course, a
different methodology is needed but majority of Pakistanis think that if they
simply unilaterally withdraw from the fight against extremists everything will
be fine. It will not be an easy task to put the extremism genie back in the
bottle. This has now become truly native and even if U.S. walks away from the
scene, this devil will devour many more souls before it is exorcised. Case of
Iraq is a good example to study.) The USA
has invested many billions in Afghanistan but its priorities are not
clear.Vaccillation , procrastination and supreme indecision remain the hallmarks
of US policy in Afghanistan.
(For a dispassionate analysis to understand better,
we need to look at facts and not carried away by emotions. Myths and romantic
notions have been passed on as history. Pushtuns have some sterling qualities
but also have their share of vices. Recently, when sectarian clashes broke out
in Parachinar, the sectarian extremists entrenched in Waziristan became jubilant
and started to arrive in Kurram to kill the Shia ‘infidel’ which is closer than
American. Turis had to set up ambushes at the strategic entrance points of the
agency to put some fear of God in them. The result was over 200 casualties.
Majority of Pakistanis do not have any clue what is eating away their
foundations.
You need to sit with a Wazir woman to at least get
the other narrative but no one is interested in that. I met an Afghan woman who
had married a non-Muslim. She was a young woman who had lived the horrors of
civil war for the spoils of 1990s. We just chatted casually but then she came
out with a statement which showed her pain. She said that I married this man
because he was the first man in my life who showed ‘respect’ to me. Unlike most
Pakistanis you are well aware of the history of the region. Remember First
afghan War of 1840s; the Gilzai tribes along the border rose against British
troops not for ideology or religion. They were happily receiving 8000 sterling
pounds per year and British troops were partying in Kabul. Many had romantic
relations with Afghan women. Then a bureaucrat wanted to save money and decided
to cut the subsidy from 8000 pounds to 4000 pounds. All tribes rose and the
rest is history. In 1980s, Afridis took toll from rebels passing through their
lands in the form of cash and weapons. When Afghan forces garrisons were
besieged, the same Afridis will supply them with food and weapons off course 100
times higher than market value. In 2008, Taliban commander of Helmand switched
sides and now serves as an advisor to U.S. ambassador to Kabul. Nothing is
changed over the centuries. This commander has not turned overnight a champion
of human or women rights or a democrat. It boils down to interest at any given
time. If tomorrow he can make a quick buck he will not hesitate to stab in the
back any Afghan or American. He may shoot at American soldier for his night
vision goggles. All this is too embarrassing for Afghans and Pakistanis to let
their children know. So the myths pass on as history. )
‘Courage among civilized peoples consists in a
readiness to sacrifice oneself for the political community. G.W.
Hegel’ Definition of bravery is different as far nation is concerned. A wise
Afghan once mentioned to me that unless ‘we learn to differentiate what belongs
to us and what to the nation, we will not move forward’. I think new model of
conflict resolution and prevention is needed. Security is just one dimension of
a complex conflict paradigm. More people to people interaction between various
groups inside Pakistan, between
Pakistan and Afghanistan and between the region and U.S. will be more fruitful
and less violent and painful. This is a long drawn process with no short cuts. Volume 7 Number 1 January 28, 2008 Major A.H. Amin (Pakistan Army, Retired)
Waziristan Vol 6 Number 5 September 4, 2007 Chris Raggio London's School Of Asian & Oriental
Studies Report On US Strike against Iran There is considerable international discussion that the confrontation
between Iran and the international community over its nuclear programme may
change in character into a major war between Iran and either US or Israel or
both in conjunction with allies such as the United Kingdom. Vol 6 Number 4 August 6, 2007 Hamid Hussain
Wages of Extremism --- Past, Present and Future of Lal Masjid Phenomenon [This article
also appears in the Pakistan Defense Journal August 2007. Reprinted with
author's permission.] Recently, in the
Pakistani capital of Islamabad, security forces launched an operation codenamed
‘Silence’ to get rid of armed extremists holed up in Lal Masjid and its
affiliated Madrassah (religious school). This operation resulted in death of
more than one hundred entrenched in the mosque as well as about ten security
personnel. The operation was watched closely by Pakistani and international
audience. Focus was mainly on the events surrounding the stand off between
extremists led by two brothers; Abdul Aziz and Abdul Rashid. There was no
attempt to look at the crisis in the broader context. It will be a folly to
look at the issue only in terms of law and order. The incident itself may be
very local in nature but it has broader implications for the country and the
region. Rise of extremism in the region has many dimensions and its effects
will also be multifaceted. The stand off at Lal
Masjid came as a surprise to many Pakistanis. With few exceptions, country has
no culture of serious academic analysis of deep rooted social and security
problems. In the last few years, there has been rapid expansion of print and
visual media outlets; however there has been very little effort to inculcate a
culture of serious and responsible discussion about vital national security
issues. Just like most of their western counterparts, majority of private
television stations are interested in sensational news with gory details. Even
debates about important issues boil down to shouting matches between
participants thus depriving the audience of any meaningful and constructive
dialogue. In the corridors of power, key decision makers simply stumble
from one crisis to another and major focus is only on crisis management as it
arises. There is no institutional mechanism for serious study of newly emerging
threats. Military and intelligence hierarchy has not been able to reform itself
to changing threats. Culture of highly personalized decision making process,
lack of input from different sources, strong inhibitory environment for
dissenting voices and unaccountability generates an environment which is not
conducive for a well informed decision making process. Those who have even
rudimentary knowledge of the events of the last two decades in the region are
not surprised about the events like stand off at Lal Masjid. This downward
trend has a long history. Pakistanis are not the only players in this drama and
therefore all the blame cannot be placed at Pakistan’s doorsteps. It is
disingenuous on part of Washington to blame everyone while completely ignoring
its own follies. Americans need to remember that two decades ago, it was
national security policy of U.S. government which was executed by Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the killing fields of Afghanistan. CIA provided
training in sabotage, handling of explosive devices and urban warfare for
yesterday’s holy warriors and today’s terrorists. Special courses were run for
target assassinations and how to make lethal bicycle, camel and car bombs.
CIA also provided sophisticated communication equipment, delayed timing
devices for plastic explosives, long range sniper rifles and high precision
targeting devices for mortars. The next generation of holy warriors is now not only using these
skills against Pakistani security forces but has acquired new ones adding
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and suicide bombers to their arsenal.
Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the civil war in the wake of withdrawal of Soviet troops changed
the dynamics of power in the region. Non state actors gradually gained strength
as the nation state of Afghanistan fragmented. The ripples were felt from
Pakistan stretching to Middle East and all the way across Atlantic to U.S. A
new breed of warriors emerged from the ashes of Afghanistan which is now shaking
the very foundations of many nation states. The seeds were sowed in 1980s when
rules of warfare were completely overhauled to suit the need of that time. All
major players including Afghans, Pakistani military and intelligence personnel,
U.S. Saudi Arabia and China conveniently ignored the brutality of their clients
and proxies on the Afghan battlefield. Everyone agreed with the principle of
armed resistance against occupying forces but in executing the policy on ground
the most brutal and inhumane tactics were employed. Afghans indiscriminately
killed civilians and indulged in activities such as skinning their adversaries
alive and sodomizing prisoners. Pakistani intelligence personnel approved and
provided logistical support for sabotage operations even in educational
institutions. Arab countries let loose their own lunatics to descend on
Afghanistan and contribute to the mayhem. The label of communist was used
liberally to eliminate school teachers, intellectuals and educated females. The
barbarity practiced on the land of Afghanistan also infected non-Afghans playing on that
field. The most bigoted and extremist fringe of Pakistani sectarian warriors
which embarked on wholesale killing of Shia in Pakistan a decade later was
schooled on the battlefields of Afghanistan. Arab extremists flew back to their
native lands to engage in barbaric acts in the name of Islam which have not even
been catalogued properly let alone analyzed. Indiscriminate killing of men,
women and children in the most horrific way in Algeria was one gory example of
this saga. Careful look at the emergence of extremism and Pakistan’s role in it
should be done not as an exercise of blame game but to understand the dangerous
trend and finding ways to curb this trend. Combination of
general discontent, Islamist discourse, deteriorating economic and security
situation and anger about some foreign policy issues are contributing to the
brew of a dangerous cocktail. Pockets of extremist militant groups are
scattered throughout the country and they can create crisis situation at any
time. These groups are rapidly expanding their area of influence. Their
influence extends from the border hinterlands of North and South Waziristan to
other border areas of Bajawar, Dir and Swat to small and large cities and now
even the state’s capital is not immune from the rapidly escalating violence.
Several small groups are taking advantage of the situation and following the
example set up by Lal Masjid. In Swat Maulvi Fazlullah is threatening to send
suicide bombers against Pakistani security forces. In Mohmand tribal agency, a
group of about 100 armed militants took control of a shrine and mosque. Their
leader offered talks with government and then threatened to unleash suicide
bombers. It looks like that everybody is obsessed with the death cult.
Extremists of all colors and shades are now popping everywhere. The big
landscape is a general trend of piety and observance of religious rituals by the
majority of population. Pakistani society has been a conservative society but
in the last two decades religious symbols and rituals are visible in public
arena. The background theme is ‘revival’ and ‘return to puritan ways’ linked
with the ‘end of the world’ and ‘arrival of Messiah’. A number of orthodox
clerics and their organizations as well as self taught neo-clerics and
evangelists are propagating their views in their respective mosques, print and
electronic media. The very nature of this phenomenon is exclusive. Each cleric
is entrenched in his own mosque or institution with no interaction with others
thus splintering general population into small groups. The negative side of
this phenomenon is entrenchment of sectarian identity. Now a more younger and
radical generation influenced by the ‘salafi’ (an ultra orthodox school
of thought based on Hanbali school of juristic traditions which stresses on
literal interpretation of scripture and discourages innovation) trend has taken
a step forward towards ‘takfir’ (apostasy) and painting their version on
the big landscape. Their modus operandi is a mix of cult and gang culture
making it very difficult to engage them in any meaningful way. In areas ridden
with violence, this younger leadership is pushing traditional peaceful clerics
out of public arena and using coercive measures to purify the community.
Religion rather than advancing the concepts of equality, economic and social
justice and egalitarianism has become a tool for the fragmentation of society. The most pressing
question now for Pakistani state and society is how to tackle this phenomenon of
extremism. As far as Pakistan is concerned, this internal threat has now
surpassed all external threats. One is the immediate security aspect of the
problem and the other is more long term holistic approach to forestall
Iraqification of Pakistan. It is now clear that threat from extremists can not
be completely eliminated but measures can be taken to limit its damaging
effects. Pakistan is facing a grave crisis and there will be security,
economic, political and social fallout from the extremism menace. Outsiders can
sympathize, warn or threaten Pakistan but at the end of the day it will be the
decision of the Pakistani state and society to determine their own future. Only
Pakistanis will decide what kind of society they are willing to live in. All
critical decisions should be made in this context carefully balancing the
benefits and risks. A closer look at the emerging threat gives a glimpse of the
future discourse in the context of Pakistan. Extremist groups are very small in
numbers and majority of Pakistanis of all ethnicities and religious
denominations are moderate and are appalled at the violent cycle. However, it
is the action generated by extremist groups which send shock waves both
internally and externally. In Pushtun areas, the extremist ideology with its
doctrine of apostasy was brought by Arab fighters. This doctrine is the
foundation stone of the legitimacy of killing fellow Muslims after they are
declared apostates. Two decades ago, during ‘external Jihad’ against the
Soviets, no suicide bombings were carried out. The tables are now turned and in
‘internal Jihad’, extremists have no qualms about using suicide bombings against
all targets; civilian and military in
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pushtun element among the
extremist groups based in tribal areas will continue to have some loose
affiliation with their kin across the border in Afghanistan. This will keep
violence graph high enough on both sides of the border and will contribute to
economic stagnation and dislocation. In both countries, Pushtuns will come
under increasing scrutiny. Whether in Kabul or Islamabad, a poor Pushtun from
the hinterlands will be viewed with suspicion further alienating a large number
and aggravating ethnic frictions. Nationalist Pushtuns may close ranks to
provide the alternative stressing on ethnic identity and will try to negotiate
with Pakistani state and international players. Influence of extremists is
making its way into the Hindko speaking belt of Hazara and Kohistan resulting in
instability in that traditionally peaceful area. In northern areas, where a
large number of Shia and Ismaili community live, the nature of conflict
invariably will be sectarian in nature. In Punjab, a decade ago, extremist
elements channeled their energy towards Indian held Kashmir. Suicide bombings
against Indian targets both civilian and military did not bother anyone in
Pakistan for over a decade. Now in ‘internal Jihad’, the same methodology is
being used against Pakistani targets. In Punjab, popular piety revolving around
shrines and tombs will not be tolerated by puritans who consider such traditions
as apostasy. The rise of extremists will fan the sectarian fires and the wages
of Jihad will be more bloodshed among Muslims. A number of groups in Pakistan
are not yet in the loop of religiously motivated violence and this include
Baluch, Sindhi and Urdu speaking known as Muhajirs. Rise of religious militancy
and weakening of national bonds will only strengthen ethnic identity of these
groups and they will use this identity while negotiating with the state or
international players. These groups will need armed wings to keep spoilers at bay and
negotiate a better bargain from the state which is a recipe for a
multidimensional internal conflict. Pakistani state is
facing a daunting challenge. On the security front, the approach needs to be
diverse and innovative depending upon the situation. The strategy needs to take
into consideration local conditions. Security operations in tribal areas have
quite different dynamics compared to urban areas. Support of local tribes both
for negotiations and punitive measures is essential. Hardcore extremist
leadership both local and foreigner cannot be eliminated without tribal
cooperation and timely intelligence. In case of attacks of large groups of
militants on settled towns such as recent attacks in Tank (a city bordering
restive tribal agencies), show of force of combination of police and
paramilitary soldiers backed by regular troops can neutralize the threat quickly
and allay the fears of general population. In case of suicide attacks by
individuals, pouring large number of troops to the scene does not serve any
meaningful purpose and wastes resources. Quick response of police to maintain
law and order and handle transfer of casualties at the scene will serve the
purpose and may be a better and cost effective approach. In fighting extremism,
lot of things can be achieved quietly and more efficiently without too much of
collateral damage. More attention should be paid to the subtle approach and
covert measures to neutralize the leadership of extremist groups. In foreseeable
future, it is clear that army will be used frequently for support of civilian
law enforcement agencies. Army should be used as a last resort and not as first option in
case of a crisis. Army’s General Head Quarter (GHQ) has to do some homework to
analyze internal threat and how to handle it. So far, everybody has been simply
waiting for the crisis and when it occurs, bodies are simply thrown at it with
the hope that something good will come out of it. Regular troops are not
trained to handle small groups of people entrenched in urban areas nor to manage
a scene of a suicide bombing. In addition, regular army troops have a long
logistical tail and movement is usually slow and costly. In view of these
limitations, government has been using Special Services Group (SSG); the elite
commando units of Pakistan army. These are highly trained soldiers and can be
effective in such situation. However, they are a highly prized commodity and
can not be replaced easily. It takes a long time to select the best soldiers
and officers and then train them in special tasks. SSG has been stretched to
its limits as they are involved in operations in Waziristan and Baluchistan. A
separate anti-terrorist battalion of SSG named Zarrar has been trained for
special tasks and was used in ‘Operation Silence’. The commanding officer
Lieutenant Colonel Haroon –ul-Islam, Captain Salman Butt and many soldiers gave
the ultimate sacrifice in the operation. Several others were injured. These
officers kept the tradition of Pakistan army by leading their men from the
front. The sad fact is that homegrown Jihadis were never able to lay their
hands on Indian Special Forces but were able to kill a number of Pakistani elite
soldiers without any moral qualms. A new special unit called Anti Terrorism Force (ATF) is being used
in some internal security cases. Expansion and strengthening of this force with
a mix of new police recruits and retired army soldiers and officers may decrease
reliance on SSG. There is a need of more coordination between civilian and
military intelligence and security entities. Use of army in internal security
duties is always a tricky situation. In case of use of religion by extremist
groups makes the task more complicated. Most of the rank and file of army is
recruited from conservative districts of North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P.)
and Punjab. The bulk of recruits are from rural areas, however soldiers are
more educated nowadays. They are not living in isolation and they are exposed
to outside world and different opinions. They are watching the same media and
reading the same newspapers. Confusion among general population affects
soldiers and sympathy shown by a segment of population for extremists can have
an impact on the morale of soldiers. GHQ needs to look at the educational and
psychological aspect of preparing soldiers for the unpleasant task of internal
security duty. In modern world, internal security operations can not be viewed
in isolation. Some covert operations are best done in total secrecy and
information is shared only among a limited group. However, in case of
deployment of troops in troubled areas or Lal Masjid type operations, government
has to take local community leaders, political parties and media into
confidence. Those involved in the decision making process of the operation have
to do the homework to prepare their case and present it as a necessary measure
to get consent of the majority of the society. In the absence of that such
operation though necessary to maintain law and order will not get the desired
results.
Editor & Publisher
Ravi Rikhye
March 2006 Archive
- US First wave Precision Strike Capability
-Military Briefing: Global Deployment of US and
Allied Naval Forces 3.24.2006
This study uses open source analysis to outline what the military option might
involve if it were picked up off the table and put into action. The study
demonstrates that an attack can be massive and launched with surprise rather
than merely a contingency plan needing months if not years of preparation.
The study considers the potential for US and allied war on Iran and the attitude
of key states. The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to
destroy Iran's WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and
economic infrastructure within days if not hours of President George W. Bush
giving the order. The US is not publicizing the scale of these preparations to
deter Iran, tending to make confrontation more likely. The US retains the option
of avoiding war, but using its forces as part of an overall strategy of shaping
Iran's actions.
- Any attack is likely to be on a massive multi-front scale but avoiding a
ground
invasion. Attacks focused on WMD facilities would leave Iran too many
retaliatory options, leave President Bush open to the charge of using too little
force and leave the regime intact.
- US bombers and long range missiles are ready today to destroy 10,000 targets
in Iran in a few hours.
- US ground, air and marine forces already in the Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan
can devastate Iranian forces, the regime and the state at short notice.
- Some form of low level US and possibly UK military action as well as armed
popular resistance appear underway inside the Iranian provinces or ethnic
areas of the Azeri, Balujistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan. Iran was unable to
prevent sabotage of its offshore-to-shore crude oil pipelines in 2005.
- Nuclear weapons are ready, but most unlikely, to be used by the US, the UK
and Israel. The human, political and environmental effects would be
devastating, while their military value is limited.
- Israel is determined to prevent Iran acquiring nuclear weapons yet has the
conventional military capability only to wound Iran's WMD programmes.
- The attitude of the UK is uncertain, with the Brown government and public
opinion opposed psychologically to more war, yet, were Brown to support an
attack he would probably carry a vote in Parliament. The UK is adamant that
Iran must not acquire the bomb.
- Short and long term human, political and economic consequences of any war
require innovative approaches to prevent the crisis becoming war.
Conclusion
The study concludes that the US has made military preparations to destroy Iran's
WMD, nuclear energy, regime, armed forces, state apparatus and economic
infrastructure within days, if not hours, of President George Bush giving the
order. This report is focused on the prospect of the possible attempted
destruction of the Iranian regime and state by the United States and its allies.
It neither examines the realities of Iran's nuclear programme, the negotiations
between Iran and the international community nor does it examine in detail the
human, political, economic and environmental consequences of such an attack.
Nevertheless a number of conclusions can be reached.
1. If the attack is "successful" and the US reasserts its global military
dominance and reduces Iran to the status of an oil-rich failed state, then the
risks to humanity in general and to the states of the Middle East are grave
indeed. The two world wars of 1914-18 and 1939-1945, the creation of nuclear
weapons, and the advent of global warming have created successive lessons that
humanity and states cannot prosper or survive long unless they hold their
security in common-sharing sovereignty and power to ensure both survival and
prosperity. A "successful" US attack, without UN authorization, would return the
world to the state that existed in the period before the war of 1914-18, but
with nuclear weapons. The self-styled realists argue that this is an inevitable
and manageable world, the naivety of imagining a nuclear armed world without
nuclear war is utopian in the extreme. States and regimes in the region may
consider that in the short-run they would benefit from the implosion of Iran and
the eclipse of Shi'a power. However, the threat from within from disaffected
elements outraged at further unabashed Western militarism is likely to threaten
crowns and republics alike. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths have had no
electoral cost to American and British leaders, the same number of Iranian
deaths may have equally little impact in the West, but it is unimaginable that
it would not cause far greater spurs to anger than already exist in the region.
The impact of on Turkey of an autonomous Iranian and Iraqi territory of
Kurdistan is hard to overestimate.
2. If the attack is pursued with the skill of the Iraq campaign then we face
major and unpredictable escalation arising from the fallacy of attempting to
make "the last move" on the political game board. Should Iranians rally to their
battered state regardless of their, then what has been seen in Iraq will merely
become an overture to a larger regional war, and one where a blip in oil prices
becomes a prolonged global recession. Regional instability that might follow
"victory" will be magnified. The Shakespearean quote, "cry havoc and let loose
the dogs of war" expresses the simple rule that wars, like fires are far easier
to start than to contain or put out.
3. The potential for a major regional war over Iran should give greater impetus
to all sides to avoid conflict and act on previously agreed objectives for
security in the region as a whole. In this respect the UNSC (687, 1540)
objective of establishing a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East should be given far
greater political investment by all parties.